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ABSTRACT Monterey, calif, 33940
This study presents a comparative analysis of how four
groups of officers view organizational effectiveness. The
four groups that were surveyed include Human Resource
Management Specialists (Navy), Organizational Effectiveness
Management Consultants (Army), surface warfare officers
(Navy), and combat arms officers (Army). The instrument
used to collect the data was a modification of the Navy's
Human Resource Management Survey (Fleet). The modification
to the survey required these officers to describe organiza-
tional states which they believed were reflective of an
"effective organization." The original Fleet survey merely
asked officers to describe what their organizations looked
like now, not how they believed they should look. Sixty
of the original eighty-eight questions were modified from
the Navy's survey. An additional forty questions were
added to these sixty questions in order to evaluate
leadership styles. These forty questions were modified from
Fleishman's leadership questionnaire. Comparative analyses
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. WHAT IS EFFECTIVENESS?
A high degree of effectiveness is normally associated
with successful or profitable organizations. Organizations
and companies that have low degrees of effectiveness con-
tinually strive to improve this organizational measure
because a high degree of effectiveness reflects the success-
ful attainment of established performance standards. The
military must also concern itself with effectiveness if it
is to be prepared to meet its mandated standards for pro-
viding for the national defense. However, there is no
clear answer as to what effectiveness means to the military.
How does the military leadership of today view effectiveness?
This is the question the authors will attempt to answer by
sampling four groups of military officers. The composition
of this sample and a discription of the instrument utilized
to obtain the responses will be provided in Chapter IV.
The term effectiveness as it relates to organizations
lacks a universally accepted definition--as do many terms
within the organizational theory field. To some organiza-
tions it may refer to profit, to others it may refer to a
share of the market, and to others it may just mean sur-
vival. Components that may determine effectiveness in
organizations often depend upon the functions, environments,

individual personalities and the value systems of that
organization. (Kirchoff 1976)
Kirchoff defines effectiveness as the measurement of
organizational performance relative to its goals. Amital
Etzioni (196*0 views effectiveness as simply the degree of
goal achievement. Webster (1965 ) provides two succinct
definitions* l) production of desired results and 2) readi-
ness for service or action. The thread of commonality among
these is the linkage of effectiveness to a set of prescribed
goals. The authors argue, however, that effectiveness must
be considered utilizing a system theory approach due to the
interaction of such components as the environment and the
complexity facing the respective organization. Such factors
as increasing inflation, foreign competition, equal rights,
automation, and the changing labor force influence the
organizational perspective and often alter, or even entirely
change, the goals and purpose of the organization. Effective-
ness can be measured in terms of its goals—but only after
the organization has taken into consideration its people
(personalities, skills), the structure (communication, chain
of command), the technology (degree of mechanization), the
environment (political, economic), and the value systems
(tradition) which are inherent in the organization.
The system approach referred to above can be applied to
most organizations and the military is no exception. For
this study, the dimensions that will be considered regarding

effectiveness include organizational climate (communication,
decision making, motivation), supervisory leadership (support,
team emphasis), peer leadership (support, team emphasis),
group processes (group coordination and discipline), and
satisfaction (needs, influence). This approach focuses on
people factors and not so much on the state of technology
or physical structure. Elements such as economics, politics,
and population-ecology as determinants of effectiveness are
utilized in more detailed models. The former model will he
used for this study because the current surveys used by the
Army and Navy are theoretically based within this model.
However, as a point of contrast, the authors will discuss
both of these models in greater detail in Chapter II.
This study is aimed at evaluating effectiveness as seen
by four different groups of officers within the Army and
Navy. For the purposes of this study, effectiveness will be
viewed as what these officers think an effective organization
should look like. The groups include Army Organizational
Effectiveness Management Consultants (OEMCs), Navy Human
Resource Management Specialists (HRMSs). Army combat arms
officers, and Navy surface-line officers. The rationale for
these particular groups of officers will be presented in
Section E below.
B. IMPORTANCE OF EFFECTIVENESS TO THE ARMY AND NAVY TODAY
The Army and Navy must concern themselves with effective-
ness because of the numerous threats they currently face.
10

Sophisticated technology of weapons systems, the questionable
quality of the All Volunteer Force, retention problems at
the mid-manager level, continued efforts to reduce manning
levels, and the decline of sufficient numbers of personnel
in the future labor market seriously strain the capability
of the Armed Forces to meet their Congressional mandate for
a high state of military readiness in the interest of
national defense. If indeed the services are tasked to con-
tinually do more with less, while concurrently being required
to meet the threat, then they too must reconsider other
factors which affect goal accomplishment and, in turn,
effectiveness. Factors to consider may include people and
their respective skills, the structure and the esprits de
corps it fosters, and the type of leadership and teamwork
that results.
Examples and elaboration of the importance of effective-
ness to the Army and Navy are appropriate. The Chief of
Staff of the Army (CSA), for instance, has gone on record
to say that he considers manning of the force to be his most
important goal. The continued loss of mid-level officers and
noncommissioned officers represents a serious loss of experience
and expertise. The effects of these losses are often counter-
acted by moving junior, less experienced personnel up to fill
these shortages. By doing this the services have in effect
placed underqualified individuals in positions demanding
higher levels of responsibility and expertise—without the
benefit of training in many instances. The net effect has
11

proven to be frustrating both to the junior individual (self-
doubt, greater demands) as well as to the supervisor who is
still expected by his superiors to maintain the same quality
and volume of service/technological expertise. In some
instances, a unit cannot even afford the luxury of filling
these positions due to existing shortages at these lower
levels also. These personnel shortages rarely, however,
result in decreased mission and goal requirements. Units
are expected to do more with less and this has created
reduced capabilities and unrealistic demands.
Personnel shortages reflect numbers of people to do the
job, but quality of personnel is just as important, if not
more important. The All Volunteer Force, concurrent with
its declining medical and pension benefits, has had dif-
ficulty providing the expertise the service needs to pro-
vide the desired state of national defense. The services
are not able to attract needed professional (doctors, nurses)
nor technical (radar, missile repairmen) personnel that the
cross-section of the draft provided. Standards, such as
number of high school graduates, are often lowered during
the recruiting effort so that quotas may be more readily
achieved. But numbers are not the real answer to the
problem of manning a force that requires increased skill
competencies
.
The threats are real and pervasive throughout the military
complex today. Accordingly, the authors content that it is
12

time to examine the philosophies of organizations held by
key personnel within the services with an aim toward
counteracting these same threats.
C. THE ARMY AND NAVY ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
The Army and Navy are highly complex, formalized/
centralized organizations operating in a dynamic environment.
The Navy's effort toward organizational development was
primarily a result in a change in the top management. In
1971. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, then Chief of Naval Operations,
wanted to find ways to improve the management of Navy
personnel resources and to increase the Navy's organizational
ability to understand and communicate with them. Other
factors which influenced the Navy's move toward organiza-
tional development include social change pressures (racial
incidents on some ships) and the political pressure at the
time for the All Volunteer Force. The Navy also wanted to
have a descriptive instrument to assess the state of organi-
zational functioning of the fleet and detect the sort of
unrest that was actually occurring on the ships in the
fleet.
The Navy approach used survey-guided development. The
survey was an adaptation of Rensis Likerts work at the
Institute of Social Research of the University of Michigan.
The survey attempts to measure the current state of organi-
zational effectiveness by looking at the following dimensions *
organizational climate, supervisory leadership, peer
13

leadership, group processes and satisfaction. The eighty-
eight question responses are based on Likert's scaling
technique of one to five, with five being the best. After
the survey is given, it is computer scored and consultant
analyzed. The summarized information is fed back to the
organization's top management for interpretation, relevancy
and meaning. After problems and needs of the organization
are identified, workshops and consulting services are
provided as the organization deems necessary.
The Army consulted with the Navy and other civilian
agencies in its development and implementation of a
survey-guided approach to organization development in the
mid 1970s. The same Likert framework was selected because
the Army saw it as useful, comprehensive and strongly tied to
a theoretical base (Likert's System k Management). The Army
was also impressed with the empirical data that had been
produced with the survey in civilian industry and hoped
for a similar predictive capacility of future organizational
states
.
The survey adapted by both the Army and the Navy con-
tains a built-in normative bias. The Likert framework
argues (assumes) that organizations are more effective the
closer the organization is to System k. System Ur espouses a
participative management style, upward and downward communi-
cation, group decision making, etc. For example, explicit
in Likert's theory is that a supervisor should be friendly
and easy to approach. But is this desirable and/or
Ik

necessary in military organizations? For the military to
accept and use this survey is to implicitly state that
System k management is appropriate and useful in the
military complex.
D. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Given the "broad missions of national defense that the
Army and Navy have, it is necessary to determine what their
philosophies and strategies are in order to achieve that
end
—
particularly in light of the threats to effectiveness
that we mentioned earlier. We need to know what the
"military is after." To analyze this the authors plan to
use a modification of the Navy Human Resource Management
Survey. Briefly, the modification asks experienced officers
(0-3 promotables and 0-4 thru 0-6) to conceptualize an
effective organization in their minds and then to respond to
the questions with this personalized concept in mind. In
contrast to the current survey, this modification also asks
officers what their organizations should look like, not
their present state. The authors plan to address the
following questions Are the Army and Navy command climate
surveys, with their inherent values and bias toward System k
Management, congruent and consistent with the values and
concepts of experienced Army and Navy officers today?
Additionally, we will analyze similarities and differences




Four groups of officers were selected for this study.
They include the OEMCs, the HRMSs, Army combat officers and
Navy surface-line officers. The rationale for these groups
follows j
1) The authors tested the theoretical base of the
current survey against personal theories of experienced
officers which resulted in the selected rank structure.
These officers have most likely had the time and the
experience to formulate, at least implicitly, their own
personal theories.
2) Operational leaders (combat arms/surface-line) were
selected because these individuals are representative of
the military leadership of the future.
3) The HRMSs/OEMCs were selected because they provided
the theoretical base for the survey; since, these officers
have been most strongly socialized by Likert's theory.
Profiles and descriptive findings concerning these four
groups of officers will be presented in Chapter V. Several
issues will be addressed. A comparison of the OEMCs and the
combat arms officers will be made to see if similar values
are held by the organizational development practitioners and
the Army community for whom it is intended. The same type
of comparison will be examined for the Navy HRMSs and the
surface-line officers. Additional questions includes Are
the values of the organizational development officers con-
sistent with the values explicitly stated in Likert's survey?
16

Is there a difference in the values held by the QEMCs and
the HRMSs? Do experienced officers in the Army and Navy
communities share the same views on what an effective organi-
zation should look like?
The introduction has provided a brief, historical over-
view with a statement of the problem to be studied. Chapter
II will present a literature review of the theories expoused
by Likert and Price. A recap of the Army and Navy organiza-
tional development programs will also be provided. In
Chapter III the authors will present an analysis that links
the military concepts to the theoretical concepts of Rensis
Likert' s System k Management. A comparison of Likert 's
explicit values will be made with those values that are
seemingly important to the military. Chapter IV will be a
presentation of the methodology highlighting how the data
were collected, the composition of the sample and rationale
therefore, and how and why the survey was modified. Chapter
V will be a descriptive chapter and will present the results
to include the profiles of the officer groups, percentage
return of the survey, the quality of the data, and a
comparison of the profiles. Chapter VI will deal with
conclusions and implications as well as considerations for
further study and analysis.
The next chapter will present the history of two models
of effectiveness as well as a look into the historical





A. RENSIS LIKERT'S SYSTEM I* MANAGEMENT
As noted in Chapter I, there are many definitions and
ways of looking at effectiveness. Organizational effective-
ness as a construct has no direct operational definition.
The authors contend that one should view organizational
effectiveness from a model or theory perspective so as to
be able to explicitly identify the key variables which
impact on effectiveness. Given these variables, one must
then look to see how they are interrelated or how they
should be interrelated. Without an explicit model or theory,
it is virtually impossible to say which variables should be
viewed as indicators of effectiveness and which should not.
It is, therefore, necessary for leaders and managers to
attempt to make their theories as explicit as possible. Two
such models will be presented to provide the reader with
multiple perspectives as well as a point of contrast.
One of the most extensive research efforts regarding
organizational systems and theory was conducted by the
Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan.
The main objective of this effort was to discover more
effective ways for an organization to efficiently achieve
their prescribed objectives. The study collected data from
more than 20,000 managers and 200,000 employees with an aim
18

toward discovery of the organizational structure and methods
of leadership and management that resulted in the best
performance. These types of variables would then be
measured against those businesses with the poorest perfor-
mance. The Office of Naval Research, along with such insti-
tutions as the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation
and the National Institute of Health, helped to fund this
program from its onset. The central group of researchers
and practitioners who carried out this research at the
Institute for Social Research included Floyd Mann, J.R.P.
French, Stanley Seashore, David Bowers and Rensis Likert.
Although Likert was obviously not the sole contributor of
this particular model of effectiveness, he has written the
most influential and renowned statement of the model.
Accordingly, it became known as the Likert-ISR Model in 1961
and, more recently in 196?. has been referred to as the
System 4 Theory of Management.
In 1967, Likert referred to the standard healthy and
effective organization as a System k organization. The
state of the organization was measured via a questionnaire
to provide survey-feedback regarding the perceptions of the
people in the organization. The questionnaire focused on
eight principal organizational characteristics
«
l) Leadership Processes. This characteristic looked




2) Motivational Practices. Of prime importance here was
whether people at all levels of the organization felt jointly
responsible for achieving the organization's goals.
3) Communication Processes. Factors included the
frequency, accuracy, and flow of communication as well as
the extent to which the communication was genuinely received.
k) Interaction/Influence Processes. Are the inter-
actions of people friendly, extensive and cooperative?
5) Decision Making Processes. This characteristic
looked at the degree to which subordinates are involved in
the decision making process, how the technical and profes-
sional knowledge of the organization is capitalized on,
and to what extent decisions are integrated throughout the
organization in a system of overlapping groups (linking pin
theory)
.
6) Goal Setting. Are goals carried out by group parti-
cipants and are the goals widely accepted by the organiza-
tion members?
7) Control Processes. This characteristic measured the
degree to which control is widespread throughout the organi-
zation, how it is shared by various levels of management,
and the extent to which it is supported by subgroups within
the organization.
8) Performance Goals/Training. Are performance goals
high and is individual job training thorough and proficient?
For the purpose of easy reference and clarification, Figure
20

2.1 presents these System 4 characteristics with a compari-
son of the classical design organizations.
Likert conceived four different systems of management
which can be measured using the dimensions listed above.
According to Likert, the System 4 type of organization is
the most advanced and also the most effective. Likert*
s
four systems of management that describe various management
styles are System Is Explicitive-authoritative ; System 2'
Benevolent-authoritative; System 3 s Consultative; and
System kt Participative. Characteristics which highlight
these four systems are outlined for the readers in Figure
2.2
Likert refers to System 1 as reflective of classical
design theory. He further contends that this system is
ineffective because it does not take into consideration the
changing nature of the environment within which the organi-
zation must operate. The System 1 theory reflects a mana-
gerial attitude and tendency toward conservatism and maintaining
the status quo. Environmental factors which merit considera-
tion include increasing competition from foreign countries,
a generally higher level of education which has led to
increased willingness for responsibility, increasing develop-
ment of complex technologies, and a trend in American society
toward greater individual freedom and initiative. These
types of changes have created pressures on managers to
adapt to these developments within their respective organi-
zations. Likert states that the most productive and
21

PROCESS CLASSICAL DESIGN SYSTEM 4
Leadership Confidence and trust low. High confidence and trust.
Subordinates uncomfortable Subordinates feel free to
discussing problems with discuss problems with
superiors. superiors.
Superiors do not solicit Superiors solicit ideas from
ideas from subordinates. subordinates.
Communication Information flow is primarily Information flow is upward,
downward. downward, and lateral.
Interaction Subordinates have little Subordinates and superiors
effect on unit's goals affect goals and methods.
and methods
.
Decisions Decision making is relatively Decis ion making is mostly
centralized. decentralized.
Goal Setting Group participation in goal Group participation in
setting is discouraged. setting objectives is
encouraged
.





Managers have little confidence and trust in subordinates.
Subordinates do not feel free discussing problems with
superiors
.
Motivation occurs through punishment , fear and threat.
Little communication takes place as information flow is
downward.
Managers have little understanding of subordinates' problems
Decisions are mostly made at the top.
Little to no cooperative teamwork exists.
SYSTEM 2: BENEVOLENT-AUTHORITATIVE
Managers have condescending trust and confidence in their
subordinates
.
Subordinates do not feel free discussing their problems
with their superiors.
Motivation is through rewards and punishment.
Most communication is downward.





Some decisions are made at lower levels.
Relatively little teamwork exists.
SYSTEM 3: CONSULTATIVE.
Managers have substantial, but not complete, trust and
confidence in subordinates.
Subordinates feel rather free to discuss matters with
superiors
Motivation occurs through rewards and occassional punishment,
Communication is both upward and downward.
Managers know and understand the problems of subordinates
quite well.
Broad decisions are made at the top. More specific decisions
are made at the lower levels.
A moderate amount of teamwork exists.
SYSTEM f: PARTICIPATION.
Superiors have complete trust and confidence in their
subordinates
Subordinates feel completely free to discuss their matters
with superiors.
Motivation is through economic rewards.
A lot of communication is upward, downward and horizontal.
Managers know and understand problems of subordinates
very well.
Substantial amounts of teamwork exists.
Decision making is widely done throughout the organization
via overlapping groups.
Adapted from Likert's The Human Organization
,
copywright 1967,
McGraw Hill 3ook Co.
Figure 2.2 Likert's Four Management Systems
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profitable organizations have adapted by moving closer and
closer to the System 4 management style. The System 4 theory
encourages greater utilization of its human assets by tapping
the full range of human motivations sharing the goal-setting
processes, and by insuring that upward, downward, and lateral
communications exist. Figure 2.1 outlines those organiza-
tional practices which depict effective organizations. The
basic assumption of System k Management is that an organization
will be optimally effective to the extent "that the leadership
and other proccesses of the organization are such as to insure
a maximum probability that in all interactions and in all
relationships within the organization, each member, in the
light of his background, values, and expectations, will
view the experience as supportive and one which builds and
maintains his sense of personal worth and importance."
(Likert 1961)
From a structural perspective, Likert views the organi-
zation as groups linked together via managers. In this
model, some managers are members of two groups. This
dual capacity role is referred to as the linking pin
theory— that is, these managers connect each group with its
immediate supervisor's group. These managers are respon-
sible for representing their groups to groups higher in
the hierarchy and for coordinating their groups with other
dependent groups in the organization. In this framework,
the superior in one group is a subordinate in another group.
24

Likert states that an organization will function best when
people function not as individuals, but as members of highly
effective work groups. If these work groups are well knit
and have high interaction, communication is enhanced,
individuals develop greater attraction and loyalty to the
group, and group members will implement goals and decisions
that are seen as most important to the group.
Likert 's research provided strong evidence that organi-
zations had much higher levels of achievement with respect
to individuals and the long run goals of the organization
when the manager exhibited a high degree of supportive rela-
tionships, utilized group decision making and supervision,
and instilled high performance goals. Likert further
introduced the concept of causal, intervening, and end
result variables.
The causal variables are those characteristics that iden-
tify the four different management systems (Figure 2.2). End
result variables are such goals as sales volume, low costs,
profit, and high quality. The intervening variables are
determined by the causal variables and include such things
as loyalty, degree of conflict versus cooperation, willing-
ness to help others, attitudes toward the organization, job
and superiors, and motivation. Likert admits that an
authoritative approach (Systems 1 and 2) may initially improve
the end result variables, but the intervening variables will
gradually begin to concurrently deteriorate. For example,
25

if communication is all downward and there is little inter-
action between superiors and subordinates, the quality of
products or volume of sales is likely to be adversely
affected. Likert believes that the participative approach
will lead to a gradual upgrading of the intervening variables
and long run improvement in the end result variables.
Likert argues that participation is one of the most important
ingredients to obtaining employee commitment and that this
commitment can result in less need for formal authority,
discipline and pressure in order to get the job done.
In summary, of Likert 's four systems, we agree that the
group participative system holds the most long-run potential
for the long-range development of the human assets of the
organization. The focues is on "people" factors and not so
much on the state of the technology or the organization's
structure. Characteristics that the System 4 organization,
or the "optimal" organization, should exhibit include super-
iors having complete trust and confidence in their subordinates;
communication channels that are upward, downward, and hori-
zontal; extensive, friendly interaction; substantial
teamwork; decision making via a linking process of over-
lapping groups; subordinates involved fully in all
decisions related to their work; goals established by group
participation; subordinates feel free to discuss things
with their supervisor; and managers always try to get ideas
and opinions from subordinates. This is but one of many
26

organizational effectiveness theories. A different approach
will not be presented to provide a point of contrast and
multiple perspectives.
B. JAMES PRICE'S APPROACH TO ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
The objective of Price's study was to "present the core
of what the behavioral sciences now know about the effective-
ness of organizations j what we really know, what we nearly
know, what we think we know, and what we claim we know."
(Price 1968)
Price surveyed fifty different published studies on
organizational behavior which included at least some considera-
tion of the notion of organizational effectiveness. In
Price's view, effectiveness is the degree of goal achievement.
Price proceeded to conduct a comparative analysis of the
fifty studies with the aim of explaining what he refers to
as the determinants of effective goal achievement.
The studies included various types of organizations
s
business firms, mental hospitals, prisons, universities,
colleges, general hospitals, and governmental agencies. The
analysis of these studies led Price to develop what have
become known as propositions regarding organizational effec-
tiveness. The determinants that Price views as impacting
upon the organization are the economic system, the external
and internal political system, the control system, and the
population-ecology system. In this model Price includes
five intervening variables which he assumes are positively
27

correlated to effectiveness* l) productivity, 2) conformity,
3) morale, k) adaptiveness, and 5) institutionalization.
The schematic diagram which depicts the relationship of the
determinants, the intervening variables, and effectiveness
is displayed at Figure 2.3*
Effectiveness in Price's terms is equivalent to producing
output. All the variables which Price uses in his findings
are compatible with systems theory; however, Price's theory
shows effectiveness as being reflected in only one element
of systems theory, that being output. Effectiveness then
becomes the dependent variable and the independent or inter-
vening variables are those of productivity, morale, conformity,
adaptiveness, and institutionalization.
It is appropriate for understanding of the Price model
to define the intervening variables. Productivity is defined
as the ratio of output to input. This can be considered to
be the same as efficiency. Conformity is the extent to
which the members of the organization adapt to and accept
its norms, procedures and rules. Morale is defined as the
extent to which the expectations and motivations of an
organization's employees are satisfied. Adaptiveness can be
defined as an organization's flexibility. It is the extent
to which an organization is able to respond to internal and
external changes. Institutionalization can be viewed as the
extent to which an organization's activities are accepted





























Adapted from Price's Organizational Effectiveness , copywright
196 8. Richard D. Irwin Inc.
Figure 2.3 Price's Organizational Effectiveness Model
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established rules for hiring and firing that are deemed to
be fair and equitable by the community members has
successfully institutionalized those same policies. The
policies have become an accepted norm within the community.
This institutionalization variable includes the activities
of satisfying personal interests, acquiring resources, and
observing rules, procedures, and norms.
One could not do justice to Price's theory without a
discussion of the major determinants also. Within the
control system, the mechanisms of division of labor,
specialized departmentalization, mechanization, and continuous
assembly contribute to effectiveness in different ways.
For example, a routinized division of labor, which generally
leads to repetitive role performance, usually results in low
morale. Mechanization lowers morale by taking the work con-
trol away from the workers.
The internal political system can be viewed as those
components which lead to organizational decisions and the
resulting acceptance and support for these decisions in the
environment. The mechanisms which operate in this deter-
minant of effectiveness are legitimacy (socially approved
behavior), rational-legal decision making, and centralization
with respect to tactical and strategic decisions. Price
contends that these mechanisms regulate the struggle for
power and increase the amount of behaviors that are dir-
ected toward goal achievement.
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The external political system considers the respective
boundaries of organizations. For businesses, customers and
stockholders would be viewed within the external political
system. The mechanisms which Price includes within this
determinant are autonomy (freedom to make decisions with
respect to the environment), ideology [publicly expressed
beliefs intended to influence others), congruence (degree
of compatibility with the culture's components), priority,
conformity, cooptation (ability to recruit members who can
increase the institutionalization), and representation
(members joining outside groups to strengthen their own
system). As an example, Price states that the greater the
organizational autonomy, the greater the likelihood the
organization can pursue its goals with a high degree of
adaptiveness and hence, greater likelihood of increased
effectiveness.
The control system can be viewed as the organization's
ability to motivate conformity toward its norms. The major
mechanisms of this determinant include sanctions (physical
force, praise) and communication. Price states that a large
supply of sanctions promotes high degrees of morale and
conformity. He further states that an organization will
increase its effectiveness the greater the degree of
vertical and horizontal communication. Communication
increases coordination which in turn increases effectiveness.
A high degree of horizontal communication decreases mis-





The final determinant in Price's model is that of
population-ecology. The major mechanisms within this deter-
minant are size (assets, profit, employees, etc.) and
spatial mobility (job rotation, transfers). Price states
that organizations most likely to have a high degree of
effectiveness will be those larger in size, except when
there is a large degree of professionalization. Large size
in this case reduces the relative importance of the pro-
fessional. In general, Price believes that a high degree
of size strengthens motivations to support organizational
decisions. Spatial mobility is deemed to increase morale.
Price has emphasized effectiveness as a single factor,
output. He tried to show that there is indeed one best
way to organize in order to achieve a high degree of organi-
zational effectiveness. For example, one of Price's propo-
sitions postulates that organizations that have a high
degree of division of labor are more likely to have a higher
degree of effectiveness than organizations that have a low
degree of division of labor. This type of prediction may
have been acceptable and palusible at the time, but since
1968, new realizations have come to pass. Specifically, the
authors argue that the development of the contingency model
refutes Price's claim. That is, an effective organizational
structure will depend on what the organization is trying to
do, how it is trying to do it, and what measures of effective-
ness are most appropriate for that particular organization.
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In summary, Likert professes that the most effective
organizations are those which engage in participative
practices and methods with its employees. In this model,
participative leadership and work group processes improve
the effectiveness of the organization. Price's model, on
the other hand, does not deal so much with the interactions
of leadership, goal setting, and participative decision
making. Price contends that there is one best way to
organize a unit's activities so as to improve the one
critical element which he claims is output. The focus of
Likert's system is primarily on people factors {to insure
participation, teamwork) while Price's model focuses on
organizing in a specific way to achieve the goal of improving
output. The authors of this thesis argue that there is no
simple model that clearly explains all the elements which
contribute to effectiveness. We believe effectiveness is
the degree to which prescribed goals and objectives are
attained. The proper measurement of this effectiveness is
dependent upon the interactions and congruencies of the
organization's mission, people, structure, technology, and
environment. Each organization is unique and accordingly,
warrants careful thought and analysis when evaluating the
effectiveness of that particular organization.
The next section will detail the history of the Army and




C. HISTORY OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE MILITARY
Organizational Development (OD) is a systematic, planned
effort to improve the functioning and effectiveness of the
organizational unit. OD examines personnel and their
interrelationships and then works to improve the commitment,
readiness, motivation, and development of individuals as
well as units. Between WWII and the late 1960s the military
made very little effort in OD. In 19^8 President Truman
issued his Executive Order desegregating the military, but
segregation continued, e.g., the mess corps of the Navy was
entirely black or Filipino. The Air Force and Army conducted
studies on a multitude of human factors that contribute to
the effectiveness of an organization, but little emphasis
was placed on this field of study. In the mid 1960s the
Department of Defense published a human goals statement
stating that everyone in the military would be treated
equally. Still the problems that plagued the country during
this time frame were affecting the values held by the
military.
The late 1960s and the early 1970s truly marked a change
in these traditional values. No longer could the military
leaders simply tell his subordinates what to do. People
wanted to know why they were told to perform specific
duties. Probably the most significant contributor to this
questioning of authority was the Vietnam War. The draftees
were coming from a population that could not understand why
3^

the United States Government was sacrificing American lives
for a conflict that the government did not even appear intent
on winning. Additionally, the minority members of the
military looked for representation of their race/creed
in the upper echelons of the services and saw none. With
the increase of racial awareness throughout the country it
is not hard to understand why there was unrest in the military,
especially when one realizes that the Department of Defense
was, and still is, nothing more than a fair approximation of
a representative sample of the entire population.
These two problems, coupled with retention problems and
the realization of the All Volunteer Force concept, led the
senior military officials to embark on a plan to increase
the effectiveness of the military. The manner in which the
Army and Navy viewed and attacked these problems and the
ensuing plans differ substantially and will be examined in
the following two sections.
D. NAVY HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (HRM)
In 1970 ADM Zumwalt stated that his objective was to
improve the management of human resources by enhancing our
understanding of and commmunication with people. (Butler
1981). This pronouncement by Admiral Zumwalt, then Chief
of Naval Operations in 1970, indicates the direction and
scope of the HRM program as developed by the Navy. Prior
to 1970, little was done by the Navy in the field of human
resources. Zumwalt' s first action in this field as CNO was
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to formulate a study group to examine the reasons for and
provide solutions to the retention and racial problems that
plagued the Navy at the time. He had the group review and
study all Naval management practices and policies. He
felt that the human element was the Navy's greatest resource
and that an application of behavioral science methods should
produce effective management.
In 1971 the group provided the Admiral with four options
to implement an organizational development program. The
first was based on the Blake/Mouton Grid Management and
Organizational Development System. The principle of this
concept was to place the leader's style of management on a
grid that ranked from one to nine. The elements measured on
the grid were the leader's concern for his personnel and his
concern for mission accomplishment. The ideal leader,
according to Blake and Mouton, was to be ranked nine, nine.
The Instrumental Survey Feedback established at the
Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan
was the second option offerred to Admiral Zumwalt. This
model recommended the use of a survey to be issued to every-
one in the command in order to obtain data on the organiza-
tion. The data would then be analyzed and fed back to the
commander .
The third option was Team Development. This model
utilized a consultant led process that developed the sense
of being part of a team with personnel having similar goals,
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tasks and relationships. The central values of this model
come from McGregor's Theory Y. The key to success of this
model was ownership of the problem regardless of individual
status
.
The final option provided was the Laboratory Learning
Method. Much like Team Development, this model was con-
sultant led, but instead of team building, it allowed the
participant to experiment with his role in the organization.
These "T" groups were intended to allow individuals an
opportunity to examine their true, internal behaviors by
encouraging a lowering of all defense mechanisms.
The first effort of the Navy into the OD field combined,
in a military staged process, all four of the models pro-
vided by the study group. They called the program Command
Development. At one time or another the experts would
either go to the fleet or vice versa, and provide the
training or collect the data of the above mentioned models.
In addition, this training provided the leader with a
leadership guidebook called the N-Man Concept which gave the
managers a "cookbook" on management styles.
This initial program was not totally successful. While
it provided the necessary training as dictated by the CNO
,
there were quite a few problems. The entire process was too
long and time consuming for both the leaders and the sailors
In addition, there was resistance to the consultant who came
on board to administer the training. In an attempt to ease
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the natural tension "between consultant and client and to get
the client to "tell it like it is," the consultants who
worked in the drug rehabilitation centers wore civilian
clothes and had their hair longer than the traditional cut.
These actions were viewed as scandalous by the conservative
senior personnel and resulted in less than full cooperation.
1972 saw the advent of more racial tension in the Navy.
Riots erupted on both the Kitty Hawk and the Constellation.
(Wright 1975 )• In an attempt to combat the continuing racial
situation and in keeping with his basic premise of the Navy's
most valuable resource, Admiral Zumwalt instituted the
Understanding Personnel Worth and Racial Dignity Program
(UPWARD). These seminars were mandatory training for all
Naval personnel. Much like the "T" groups, these seminars
had the participants "let it all hang out." Whatever was on
anyone's mind in regard to racial prejudices was brought to
the group's attention. This program provided a valuable
tool for release of frustrations built up by the minorities
of the Navy, but there was a severe consequence. The UPWARD
seminars were not viewed as assisting the commander in
organizational effectiveness. This, coupled with the
liberal appearance of the HRM consultants, resulted in Navy
managers being "turned off" by the HRM program.
Still the program continued to grow under Admiral Zumwalt 's
direction. Four HRM centers were established to provide the
fleet (Atlantic and Pacific) with expert assistance. In
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addition, centers were placed in Washington, D.C., and London,
England, to provide shore commands with this same expert
advice. To train the experts a school was established in
Memphis, Tennessee, to provide these individuals with the
skills necessary to interact with their operational clients.
The goals of the HRM program were ambitious. They were
5
Increased awareness of the Navy's Human Goals Credo.
Improved unit readiness.
Improved communications throughout the chain of command.
Improved image of the Navy as professionals
.
Improved leadership and human resource management.
Improved job satisfaction.
Total involvement of the chain of command in increasing
productivity of the Navy.
Insurance of equality in all administrative action.
Increasing acceptance of host country culture by Naval
personnel and their dependents.
Recognition of alcoholism as an illness.
Reduction of alcohol and drug related incidences.
Development of Human Goals Action Plan.
Retention of quality people. (Butler 198l)
In 1973 the "HRM Cycle" was established to accomplish the
goals listed above. Each command was scheduled for this
nine staged cycle. This cycle included s initial visit,
data gathering, data analysis, feedback to the client,
planning for actions to be taken, implementation of plans
by consultants, unit action, follow-on activities provided
by the consultants to the client, and follow-up visit.
This cycle, with minor refinements to the models described
earlier, is the system used by the Navy today.
The problems that plagued the establishment of this field
are still prevalent. While there is general consensus among
Naval personnel that increased effectiveness is in part a
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function of work relationships and individual job satis-
faction, the method of accomplishing that effectiveness
is still in question. The HRM cycle being used is still
extremely time consuming. In addition, the previously held
beliefs by the operational personnel regarding the sometimes
liberal consultants and the UPWARD type seminars which had
been conducted, still result in less than f-ull cooperation
and support of the HRM program.
E. ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
The Army's approach to OD differs significantly from the
Navy; although, the Army utilizes many of the same tools for
data collection/intervention. The Army's effort in this field
started in 1969 at Fort Ord, California.
The Commanding General of this basic training facility
wanted to reduce the cost of training without reducing the
performance of the soldiers. He foresaw the end of the
draft and wanted to have his unit prepared to put out
quality soldiers with fewer assets. The Training Management
Evaluation Committee that he established studied the problem
at hand and recommended several measures by which the satis-
faction level of the trainees and cadre could be measured.
It was felt that high satisfaction would result in better
performance for the lower cost. In 1972, Fort Ord began
week-long training that included self-awareness seminars,
group problem-solving workshops, and inter- communication
exercises. Based on the success of this program, Fort Ord
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implemented an OD plan that had the following goals? "better
organizational communication and flexibility, greater commit-
ment to Army goals, more personal motivation, and job
satisfaction. Simultaneously, the Chief of Staff of the
Army, General Westmoreland, started his own study group at
the Department of the Army level to determine how to
broaden the Army's use of behavioral science methods so that
organizations could become more effective.
After being oriefed on the available expertise in the
field, General Westmoreland decided to fund five projects to
determine the feasibility of OD in the Army. These five
projects were survey feedback, conducted in United States
Army Europe; OD in a staff environment, conducted at
MILPERCEN, Washington, D.C.; an assessment center conducted
at Fort Benning, Georgia; skills in management, conducted
at Fort Bliss, Texas; and OD at an installation, conducted
at Fort Ord, California.
The pilot test at Fort Ord began in 1972 and was named
the Motivation Development Program. The goals of this
program were to determine how behavioral science methodologies
could best be incorporated into the Army's educational system,
to determine the minimum staff requirement to perform OD
functions at other installations, to refine OD techniques
for the military, to measure the effects of OD on a typical
organization, and to develop educational material for incor-
poration into the educational system. Fort Ord ' s mission was
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further expanded in 1973 when it was placed in charge of the
Army's Leadership and Management Development Course. While
this was not originally considered to be a function of OD,
the Army realized the potential of training the future
leaders with the behavioral science methods required for OD
.
Like the Navy's first attempt into OD , the Army's initial
program at Fort Ord encountered problems. There was little
support from top level managers with the familiar complaint
of not having enough time to devote to this "nice to have"
program. In addition, the original client of this program
was larger than first requested. The coordinators had hoped
for a very small unit to work with in order to work the bugs
out of the program. Instead, they were directed to consult
with a 550 nian organization. The size of the unit was too
prohibitive to effectively accomplish the desired goals. In
an attempt to make the organization manageable, the pilot
test was broken down into three separate company size units
(120 personnel each). The first was the leadership and
management development (L&MD ) company that utilized the L&MD
training program of instruction. The second was the OD
company that utilized behavioral science techniques such as
surveys and interviews to determine the climate of the
organization. The third company was used for control. In
an attempt to minimize the Hawthorne Effect, the commander
of this unit was told that his unit was "next in the barrel"
for the program. The test results indicated a positive
correlation between the training in both units and the
overall job satisfaction of the personnel.
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With the scheduled end of the pilot programs in sight
[1975K Department of the Army coordinated with Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Forces Command (FORSCOM) to
establish the U.S. Army Human Resource Management Training
Activity at Fort Ord , California. This activity combined
the inputs of the five originally funded projects to for-
mulate the Army's first organized unit for organizational
effectiveness.
Soon after the establishment of the activity, the name
was changed to the U.S. Army Organization Effectiveness
Training Center. The Army called their new technology
organization effectiveness (OE) for two reasons. There was
concern by the founders regarding senior officer acceptance
of the term OD, especially since this was a "civilian"
terminology. Human Resource Management was ruled out due to
the fear of being identified with the Equal Opportunity and
Drug/Alcohol Programs. The term OE seemed to have the
correct connotations of unit effectiveness that the training
center was trying to portray.
The OE program is tailored to the individual unit com-
mander. It can use any or all methods available for data
collection/analysis and interventions. The purpose of the
program is to assess the situation, assist in action plan-
ning by the chain of command, implementation of the plan, and
feedback/evaluation. The program itself is designed for
organizational improvement. It is not a one shot attempt
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at improvement, but rather a long-range plan for increased
effectiveness. It is a data based, systems approach looking
at the entire organization with the goal of improving effective-
ness. (Hewitt 1980)
As previously stated, the Army's OE program and the
Navy's HRM program have taken different paths to the same
goal, i.e., improved unit effectiveness. While the Navy's
program encompasses a larger variety of issues, both services
utilize the survey-feedback method of collecting and analy-
zing data. The data is then passed on to the commander for
action. Both services work with the commander in developing
action plans and implementation procedures. Then feedback
is provided to assist the commander in future actions. The
goal and purpose of each organization is to increase the
effectiveness of the respective services.
The next chapter will present and examine the compati-
bility between the values espoused by Likert as being
important when considering effectiveness and the values that
we, the authors believe, are important to the military today.
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III. LINKAGE OF LIKERT AND MILITARY VALUES
A. PROFESSIONAL MILITARY ETHICS AND VALUES
Just as effectiveness has no universally accepted defini-
tion, so is the case with professional military ethics and
values. The military has no expli-cit formal code of ethics
and values. The closest guide may be that as expressed "by
officer manuals and the motto of the United States Military
Academy, West Point, New York--that of duty, honor, country.
There is a code of conduct for prisoners of war and a
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) for legal matters,
hut little else that explicitly dictates those values that
should be shared as important by all military officers.
The military professional ethic does not arise from a
single cause nor can it be explained by any one single model.
However unique the military may seem, it is by no means
isolated from the social, political, and economic currents
of the larger American society. The military derives its
identity from the ideals of the society for which it serves.
Thus the professional military ethic can be viewed as a
set of expected behaviors that results from the trust and
confidence that is vested in the military by the American
society. It also cannot be overlooked that the civilian
society is the entity which maintains the military's
strategic direction, budgetary support, and personnel input.
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So to the extent that the military is out a suborganization
of American society, perhaps the values of this society are
those of the military. But here contradictory values can
"be shown to exist that portray a certain uniqueness to military
lifestyles
.
The American society espouses such well known values as
liberty, democracy, freedom, humanism, equality, and peace.
A case can be made that the military emphasizes a need for
authority, hierarchial control, obedience, loyalty, patriotism,
and a disciplined force capable of waging war. The military
society is to a certain degree self-sufficient. It has its
own traditions, customs, legal system and support systems
(transportation, education, engineer, medical, etc.). The
authors believe the military is unique and that its pro-
fessionalism can be defined in terms of expertise, res-
ponsibility, and association. The values that relate to
these professional traits would be the degree to which the
military officer adheres to the unlimited obligation of
service to his country and allegiance to duly constituted
authority (Constitution, UCMJ), the degree to which he
acquires and applies the requisite competence to meet his
duty requirements, and the conformity to which he shares values
that are essential to honoring the trust and confidence placed
in him by his country.
The problem with the aforementioned values are two-fold.
First, it is easy to find acceptance with broad values, but
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it is extremely difficult to translate these same values
into specific guidelines for behavior. On the other side of
the coin though, it would be extremely difficult to specifi-
cally and explicitly cite all expected values such that they
would encompass all possible situations. This broad-narrow
argument is perhaps the very reason that no explicit code has
ever been developed for the military officer. Secondly, the
mere size and diversity of the peacetime force make it inher-
ently difficult to establish a total commitment to any one
set of values. The services, just as in American society,
are made up of human beings who are subject to mistake, mis-
understanding, and temptation. This becomes more evident as
one reflects on the recent revolutions that have taken place
in American society that serve to challenge the values of
patriotism and authority. There have been economic, political,
social, educational, youth, and sexual revolutions that have
challenged the moral, philosophical, and ideological grounds
of many traditions and policies. These changes have resulted
in changed behaviors of people and accordingly, changed and
different value systems. Hence, the inherent difficulty in
establishing commitment to any one set of values.
Another element which impacts on professional military
ethics and values is the environment. The services are large
in size, increasingly complex and increasing substantially
in developing personnel transfer potential to the civilian
sector. These are but a few of the problems associated with
the external environment. The internal environment is just
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as explosive. The military services maintain increasing
expectations of perfection (officer efficiency reports,
equipment maintenance standards); create attitudes of
"ticket punching" as criteria for success; display behaviors
and actions just to "please the boss"; use fear as a motiva-
tor; and promote career ism--advancing one's career at the
cost of one's integrity. These internal and external con-
straints further diminish the military's ability to establish
commitment to a given set of values.
A study conducted in 1970 by the U.S. Army War College on
military professionalism was designed to assess the pro-
fessional climate of the Army, to identify any problem areas,
and to formulate corrective actions. The data was obtained
from interviews, seminars, and questionnaire responses from
450 officers from six Army schools at the advanced and staff
course levels. The study involved an elite cross section
of the officer crops and indicated the concerns of the
aspiring leadership of the Army. The study revealed that
the ideal climate was characterized by individual integrity,
mutual trust and confidence, unselfish motivation, technical
competence, and an unconstrained flow of information. However,
the existing professional climate was perceived as selfish
behavior, distorted priority setting, careerism, cover-ups
due to organizational pressures, looking upward to please
superiors rather than fulfilling legitimate needs of sub-
ordinates, inadequate technical and managerial competence,
48

and incomplete communications "between juniors and seniors.
This study certainly revealed dissatisfaction within the
officer corps concerning what is and what should be the
military professional climate.
As there are no well defined nor accepted explicit set of
values for the professional military officer to internalize,
the authors will present the following set of values that we











Values from this list can easily be added or deleted. It
is not the gospel, but we do believe it to be as acceptable
in lieu of any yet to be published set of military values
and ethics.
B. LIKERT'S VALUES
As stated in Chapter 2, Likert believes that the most
productive and most effective organization is the System 4
type of organization. The System k organization is charac-
terized by a high degree of participation, by leadership
practices that exude trust and confidence between superiors
and subordinates, by a free flow of information upward,
downward, and lateral throughout the organization, by group
decision making that is basically decentralized, and by group
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participation in goal and objective setting procedures. Par-
ticipation is the key ingredient to Likert's model and value
system. Likert contends that participation enhances employee
commitment and that this commitment can then result in a
lessened need for formal authority and discipline to get the
job done.
The values that are explicit to Likert's theory can best
be outlined in the five dimensions used within the question-
naire. The first dimension is that of organizational climate.
Values important in this dimension include the free flow of
information, a listening and responsive leadership, decisions
made at the level where the most information exists, per-
sonnel motivated for efforts through rewards and career
enhancing duties, and a perceived concern for the human
element.
The second dimension is that of managerial leadership.
Some of the values explicit to this dimension include a high
feeling of subordinate worth and dignity due to support from
approachable and understanding supervisors, a high degree of
teamwork problem resolution through subordinates and superiors
working together. The third dimension of peer leadership
is very similar to the aforementioned supervisory leadership.
It is characterized by the same degree of positive support
to enhance personal worth, close cooperative teamwork, and
mutual problem resolution.
The fourth dimension of work group processes is charac-
terized by members of the organization mutually coordinating
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and supporting each other, by a capability to respond
effectively to crisis situations, by exhibiting high stan-
dards of discipline and decorum, and by groups working
cooperatively with each other. The fifth dimension of
satisfaction reflects the degree to which individual members
are satisfied with their superior, job, unit effectiveness,
and fellow workers. It also reflects the degree to which
fair and equitable treatment is afforded all members in such
areas as promotion, education opportunities, and assignments.
As can be easily surmised, Likert espouses the promotion
of an organizational climate that is highly participative,
cooperative, has a listening and responsive leadership,
promotes open communication and discussion, exhibits a high
degree of concern for the human element, and insures fair
and equitable treatment of all its personnel. Since these
values and dimensions are descriptive of Likert' s System ^
management style, it is necessary to compare these values
with those of the military to see if in fact, Likert'
s
values are congruent with those of the military.
C. LIKERT-WULITARY VALUE LINKAGE
Although the Likert System k management style was actually
tested and validated within civilian industry, the Army and
Navy determined that the Likert instrument was useful, com-
prehensive, and capable of predicting future organizational
states in the military. The use of the adapted Likert survey
by the military is to implicitly state that the System 4
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management style is appropriate for use within the military
society. But are the values espoused by Likert similar to
or desirable given the value system of the military?
The authors contend that there are many values within the
Likert model that are congruent with military values, par-
ticularly if we consider the Army War College study men-
tioned in Section A above. The ideal climate perceived
by these senior, aspiring officers was characterized by per-
sonal integrity, unselfish motivation, free and open
communication flows, and mutual trust and confidence. These
desired values are easily correlated with values critical
to the Likert model. For instance Likert strongly supports
upward, downward, and lateral communications, an understanding
and supportive leadership (avoidance of carreerism), team-
work and cooperation (requiring trust and cooperation), and
commitment to the organization and its goals (unselfish
motivation). These values which are perceived as" the ideal
climate for the military are certainly supported by the
values inherent in the dimensions of Likert' s model.
Despite these apparent congruent values, there are some
military practices, vested in its own traditions and cus-
toms, that may not have strong ties to the value system
of System k. For example, there is a strong and legitimate
basis for the existence of hierarchial control and authority.
This positional power, derived by rank and based within the
UCMJ, is often the means by which military discipline and
52

obedience are obtained. This method of obtaining commit-
ment is in some ways different from the participative,
cooperative, supportive method inherent in Likert's theore-
tical base.
Decision making in the military is not commonly made
utilizing the group problem solving process. Policies are
often made for a military unit by the person in the power
seat based on his/her personal experiences and prejudices.
Often times when problems are continually handled using group
or committee action, the leader is often perceived as inde-
cisive or "wishy-washy." In the same vein, though open
communications and discussion may be helpful, after a decision
has been made it is not readily accepted that people will then
sit down and negotiate that same decision. The point to be
made is that traditions and expectations dictate that a
military leader be powerful and decisive in order to gain
the requisite respect and discipline. Likewise a supervisor
who gains a reputation of being friendly and easy to approach
may not be held in the highest regards by his immediate
supervisor
.
We believe that given a wide range of values and ethics
which can be cited, there are sufficient similarities and
congruencies between Likert's values and the broadly stated
values of the military to warrant and justify the application
and utilization of the respective surveys.
53

D. RATIONALE AND HYPOTHESES
Given these similarities and differences the following
four groups were surveyed to determine the relevance of
Likert's System k to the military, l) Army Organizational
Management Consultants (OEMCs), 2) Navy Human Resource
Management Specialists (HRMSs), 3) Navy surface-line officers,
and k) Army combat arms officers. The OEMCs and HRMSs have
received formal training in theories and philosophies
related to managerial practices. To provide a point of
comparison, we surveyed the line officers and combat arms
officers because they deal with the day-to-day operations
of the combat force for the respective services and typi-
cally have not received formal training in managerial theory
for the express purpose of carrying out their duties more
effectively.
The OEMC trained individuals attend a sixteen week course
at Fort Ord, California, in order to prepare themselves for
the methods and practices that the Army espouses as being
functional and effective for use in the field. The course
does not solely preach Likert's model, but also exposes
everyone to the latest in managerial strategies, theories,
and philosophies. The school provides a system theory
approach for these newly trained consultants to internalize
that is similar to the components that the authors mentioned
in Chapter I as being important in the consideration of
effectiveness. These components include consideration of
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people, structure, technology, processes, and the environment.
After receiving such "broad yet intensive training, we believe
that this type of individual will more likely reflect an
organizational management approach that is similar to Likert's
System ^ . These individuals then go on to Army commands and
dedicate their services to that particular command in the
capacity of an internal consultant. The authors hypothesize
that these individuals should believe in such practices as
upward, downward, and lateral communications and participation
in decision making and goal setting by virtue of this
training.
The individuals who are trained by the Navy to become
HRMSs normally attend a twelve week school at the HRM School
in Memphis, Tennessee. The training is similar to that
received by the OEMCs with the exception that these officers
do not go on a four week exercise to practice their newly
acquired skills and talents. They are exposed to different
management styles and the interaction of the components that
are a part of the system theory. The HRMSs are then sent to
one of fourteen HRM Centers/Detachments . They then provide
services to any local shore units, air squadrons, or ships
that may be in the area at the time. By virtue of their
specialized training, we believe that these officers should
also reflect Likert's System k management as that which is
the most effective.
The combat arms officers and the surface warfare officers
do not as a practice receive specialized training in human
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resource management areas. These officers are trained in
the conduct of combat and retain the mission of "being
prepared to win the first battle of the next war. These
officers are not generally asked by their superiors if they
have conducted participative decision making or whether
there is effective lateral communication in their respective
organization. The primary concern in these units is whether
the mission is accomplished as directed. Emphasis is on
mission accomplishment rather than methodology. Assuming
that these officers are results oriented, we hypothesize
that these groups of officers will lean more toward the
authoritative style described by Likert as Systems 1 and 2.
These groups are different because of the training they
receive, the missions they are given, and also because of
commonly accepted traditions and customs of the military.
The nature of organizational effectiveness training is new
to the services and, as of yet, has not been totally accepted
and supported by all hierarchial levels. Resistance to this
new concept has been, and still is, prevalent throughout
the military. Professionally trained combat officers do
not feel that they need to be told how to communicate with
their men nor how to make decisions. History has shown
that aggressive, forceful, demanding officers have succeeded
within the military profession without a school-trained
management consultant to assist them. Given these differ-
ences and resistances, we, the authors, plan to test the
following hypotheses through the administration of a survey




1) The OEMCs will report a higher mean score than their
operational counterparts. (Army Combat Arms Officer)
2) The HRMSs will report a higher mean score than their
operational counterparts. (Navy Surface Line Officer)
3) The OEMCs and HRIVISs will report similar means.
4) The combat-arms officers and surface-line officers
will report similar means.
The methodology employed to administer and collect the
survey data will be presented in the following chapter. A





A. SURVEY ADMINISTRATION AND DATA COLLECTION
As previously stated, the survey (Appendix A) utilized
was a modification of the Navy's Human Resource Management
Survey (Fleet). The major modification of the survey was
the number of questions added and deleted rather than the
type of question. The primary goal of the survey was to
have the respondent imagine the "ideal" working conditions
and to describe these conditions with the answer categories
provided. The intention was to describe the ideal, not the
current state. The key phrase in the administration of the
survey was "In an effective organization." From this per-
spective the respondent characterized the five basic dimen-
sions of effectiveness inherent within the Likert framework.
Data were solicited from four major groups. These groups
included the HRMSs, the OEMCs, the combat arms officers, and
the surface warfare officers. The rank structure for the
categories ranged from 0-3 to 0-6. The basis for this
selection of officers was to solicit the responses of the
officers who have been in the service a sufficient period of
time to have developed some "personal theory of management."
In addition, these officers are most likely to have been
closely associated with soldiers and the basic organizational
element of the Army (company) or Navy (department). Therefore,
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the combat/surface warfare officers could adequately repre-
sent the views of the operational side of the military while
the OEMC/HRJVIS officers represented the "experts" in the field
of Human Resource Management. These selected groups obviously
are not the only people who have the experience to provide
valuable data. However, it must be noted that this study
is merely the first stage of a newly conceived research
effort and will serve to provide baseline data and recommen-
dations for further study and analysis.
The survey was mailed to one hundred OEMCs in the grades
of 0-3(P) through 0-6, stationed in the continental United
States and Europe, whose names were obtained from the 0E
School at Fort Ord, California. Officers below the specified
ranks were not surveyed because we wanted to limit the scope
of this initial effort. In addition, time was a limiting
factor for the purpose of this study.
Sixty surveys were sent to the following HRM centers
2
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; San Diego, California; Washington
D.C.; and Norfolk, Virginia. These centers in turn sent
copies to detachments at Alameda, California; Charleston,
S.C; Whidbey Island, Washington; New London, Connecticutt
;
Mayport, Florida; Yokosuka, Japan; and Subic Bay,
Phillipines. Oversea centers were not selected due to the
limited time and scope of this initial research effort. The
obvious difference in sample size between the Army and Navy
is a result of the Navy's smaller community of senior HRMCs.
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The size could have been increased by including junior
officers and Chief Petty Officers, but the data would then
represent a different sample population. These two groups
then provide the basis for comparing formally trained
officers in human resource management strategies with the
following two groups of officers s the combat arms officers
and the surface warfare officers.
One hundred surveys were distributed throughout the three
major brigades in the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord,
California. The surveys were then sent down to battalion
and company size units for completion. The return rate was
probably affected by the substantial amount of training
these units were undergoing at the time. Additionally, the
surveys were forwarded to the units for completion rather
than assembling the respondents as a group to complete the
survey. The authors opted for this method because of time
constraints and realization of the heavy workload these
units of the division had at the time.
In order to obtain a comparable group for the HRMSs as we
did for the OEMCs, we surveyed seventy-five Naval officers
currently attending the Naval Postgraduate School. These
officers were selected because of ease in survey adminis-
tration and time constraints. These officers were all
0-^s and above and all in the surface warfare community.
These officers have spent at least one tour at sea and had





Of the original eighty-eight question survey administered
by the Navy, the authors selected sixty representative
questions. The following is a breakdown by dimension of
the exact number of questions presented to the sample
population?
Command Climate - All questions.
Supervisory Leadership - All questions.
Peer Leadership - Eight out of twelve questions.
Work Group Processes - Five out of nine questions.
End Result Measures - Twenty out of forty questions.
The reason for the deletion of the twenty-eight ques-
tions was the length of the survey. It was the opinion of
the authors that the addition of these questions would not
significantly add to the study and might result in less than
a total effort by the respondents.
The survey was broken down into these dimensions to
evaluate key elements in any organization. The first dimen-
sion described was that of command climate (Questions 1-14).
This portion of the survey refers to the procedures, policies
and condtions within which a group performs the mission of
the organization. These conditions and policies are typically
created by the command hierarchy. The following are aspects
of climate that were evaluated* communications flow,
decision making, motivation index, and human resource emphasis
The critical element in this dimension was the evaluation of
how the group reacts to policies placed on them and procedures
utilized by higher headquarters.
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The next dimension examined was supervisory leadership
(Questions 15-27). This index evaluates the behavior of the
supervisor toward his subordinates as well as the character-
istics of an effective leader. The various sub-categories
are support, team coordination and team emphasis, goal
emphasis, and work facilitation. The thrust of this section
was to evaluate the degree of support and guidance the super-
visor gives to his subordinates. In addition, this indice
examined actions of an effective leader as determined by
the respondent.
The same sub-categories for supervisory leadership were
then utilized to evaluate peer leadership (Questions 28-35)*
This dimension examined the behavior of work group members
toward each other. Support, coordination, and work facilita-
tion are major areas of interest. The emphasis of this
section was teamwork, the degree to which peers cooperate
with each other on mission accomplishment, and the level
of confidence subordinates have in each other.
The fourth dimension examined was work group processes
(Questions 36-40). The way in which group members share
information, make decisions, and solve problems determines
the group's productivity and quality of its outputs, i.e.,
its effectiveness. Key elements evaluated were work group




The fifth dimension meshes several components together to
examine end result measures (Questions ^0-59) • These ques-
tions evaluate the degree of self-satisfaction of individuals
within the command toward supervisors, group members, and
the job. In addition, lower level influence and training
were measured to determine the degree of influence that the
lower levels of command have on the organization and the
amount of training provided for upward mobility. Finally,
equal opportunity questions and drug abuse/alcohol prevention
questions were asked to determine the effective organization's
position on these issues. It should be noted that these
questions are not the only dimensions that impact on equal
opportunity and/or drug/alcohol prevention. Command climate
also indicates the organization's ability to deal with these
areas. The reasoning for placing these questions in the
survey was to gather explicit information on these highly
visible areas rather than implicit information gathered from
other parts of the instrument.
In addition to the five dimensions of the Likert survey,
the authors added leadership style (Questions 61-100) as a
major determinant of an effective organization. These forty
questions were adapted from the Fleishman Leadership Opinion
Questionnaire and concentrated directly on the style of
leadership exhibited by the manager. Key areas of interest
are the leader's rapport with his subordinates, communications




The final portion of the survey (Questions IOI-IO3) asked
the respondent to evaluate his/her experience with the HRM/OE
programs. The thrust of this section is where has the HRM/OE
program been the past three years, where is it today, and
where will it "be in the future. The data was then compiled
and analyzed bycomparing the various dimensions of the survey
by the corresponding groups that were selected for survey.
C. SURVEY RETURN
Table 4.1 displays the data regarding survey distribution
and return. The overall return rate of over 50fo is perceived
to be good for a survey of this type. The higher percentage
return rate for the HRMS category is believed to be a function
of the rapport that these centers and detachments have with
the Naval Postgraduate School. The equally high return rate
for the Naval surface warfare officers is believed to be a
result of the fact that these officers saw the survey as an
opportunity to help fellow graduate students with their
thesis requirement. The Army return rate is believed to be
relatively lower because of the method of survey administra-
tion and training requirements on the post at the time of the
survey distribution. The fairly good return rate of the Army
OEMCs is believed to be a result of assisting fellow Army
officers in the field of organizational effectiveness.
D, SURVEY ANALYSIS PLAN
In reporting the data, the authors utilized the five




Table 4.1 Survey Distribution and Return Rate
SURVEYS DISTRIBUTED SURVEYS RETURNED RETURN PA'
Naval HRMS 50 43 72%
Army OEMC 100 56 56':
Surface-Line 75 43 5 7%
Combat Arms 100 42 42%
TOTALS 335 134 55%
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categories for comparison. The reported sub-categories were
derived from a minimum of two-thirds of the questions from
the original survey being presented in this instrument. If
the number of questions did not meet this two-thirds criterion,
then the results were reported as part of the major category.
For example, Peer Leadership (Support) has three questions
on the original survey. Two of these questions were
utilized in the administration of this survey so Peer Leader-
ship (Support) was established as a reported sub-category.
On the other hand, only three of the thirteen questions
regarding equal opportunity were utilized; therefore, the
results are not reported separately, but rather as a part
of the total category--end result measures. The leadership
opinion survey is broken down and reported in two major
categories. Twenty questions relate to personnel, concen-
trating on the leader's rapport with his subordinates. These
questions are reported as "personnel considerations." The
other twenty questions evaluate the leader's emphasis on
mission accomplishment and the actual operating procedures
of the unit. These questions are reported as "structure
orientation." The final three questions of the survey are
presented separately to evaluate the respondents' views of
the OD effort in the military. This category is referred
to as program satisfaction.
The data was then analyzed by comparing the mean responses
of the HRMSs versus the OEMCs; the Navy surface-line officer
66

versus the Array combat officer; the HFJVISs versus the Navy
surface-line officer; and the OEMCs versus the Army combat
officer. A "t" distribution analysis was run to determine
the significance of the reported differences of the means.






Before discussing the significance of the collected data,
it is appropriate to address the perceived quality of the
data. The percentage return rate presented in Chapter IV,
Section C shows an overall survey return rate of 55%' However,
there is a J>5% difference between the lowest category (combat
arms) and the highest category (HRMS). Accordingly, the
authors find it necessary to present a discussion regarding
the data collected from each category.
The HRMS return rate of 72% was significantly higher than
the other three categories. We believe this high response
rate was in part due to personal contact between the advisor
of this study, Dr. Reuben Harris, and the commanders at the
respective HRM centers and detachments. A personal letter
was sent to each commander to advise him of the forthcoming
survey and to request his support in this embryonic research
effort. The high response rate from the Navy HRMSs may also
be attributed in part to their desire to be an integral part
of Navy sponsored research that relates directly to the
nature of their duties. The authors do not believe that the
seventeen surveys that were not returned would significantly
alter the mean responses of this group.
The OEMC return rate of 5&% > though not as high as the
Navy's counterpart, is considered high by the authors.
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Surveys were mailed "by name to officers in grades 0-3(P) to
0-6 who were serving as OEMCs in the continental United
States (CONUS) and Europe. Names were obtained from the
latest updated roster at the 0E School at Fort Ord,
California. Officers who did not return the surveys may
have changed assignments or may not have arrived at their
next duty station in time to complete the survey. Despite
these possible reasons for the non-return of forty-four
surveys, it should be noted that this sample may be biased
if in fact only officers interested in the program returned
the survey. Lower responses from these forty four people
could in fact substantially change the mean responses for
the given categories. Readers of this study should keep
these facts in mind when evaluating and analyzing the
presented results.
The return rate of Sli for the Naval surface warfare
officers is considered high. These officers, who are
currently attending the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in
Monterey, California, were selected in the interest of time
and ease of data collection. Surveys were sent through the
student mail center to the seventy-five surface warfare
officers who are in grades 0-^ and above. The officers'
addresses were obtained from the NPS Personnel Office. This
sample may also be biased if one assumes that the Navy sends
its proven and most promising officers to NPS. Despite this
possible bias, this sample is indeed appropriate for this
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study in thai: these officers are a fair representation of
the Navy's officer leadership of the future in the surface
community. Additionally, these officers have been to sea
for at least one tour and have had the necessary managerial
experience with which to form a "personal theory of organi-
zational effectiveness."
The return rate of ^2% for the Army combat arms officers
is disappointingly low. The 7th Infantry Division at Fort
Ord, California, was selected as the installation to provide
the Army's data input because of its proximity to NPS . This
facilitated survey distribution and data collection. However,
the three major brigades at Fort Ord were heavily inundated
with additional training requirements at the time. The
personnel officers who distributed the surveys within the
respective brigades also emphasized the voluntary aspect
of their completion. It should also be recognized that this
group of officers is different from the Naval surface warfare
group. Captains in the Army(0-3s) represent the largest
group of the officer ranks within brigades. These officers,
who average between six to eight years of service, do not
have as much time in service nor the experience of the Naval
officers. Even with the inherent difficulties mentioned
above, these officers should be a fair representation of the
Army's leadership of the future. They have also had some
time to react to, reflect on, and formulate personal theories
of organizational management and effectiveness.
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B. DISCUSSION OF GROUP MEAN DATA
Before subjecting the data to statistical analysis, it
is appropriate to look at the mean scores of each of the
surveyed groups for each category and sub-category. We
will look for any possible trends, commonalities, or notice-
able differences that may exist. The group mean data by
category and sub-category are depicted at Table 5«1«
The authors developed twenty-seven categories and sub-
categories from the 103 core questions of the survey. As
noted in Chapter IV, Section D, some questions that were
used to comprise sub-categories, were later grouped to form
categories. For example, the sub-categories of communica-
tion flow, decision making, motivation, and human resource
emphasis were later grouped together to form the category
represented as command climate. The five main categories
of Likert's survey that are used by the Army and Navy are
those of command climate, supervisory leadership, peer
leadership, work group processes, and end result measures.
The authors added the three categories of personnel consider-
ations, structure orientation, and program satisfaction in
order to look solely at the dimensions of officer leadership
and satisfaction with the OE and HKM programs. To determine
this level of satisfaction the respondents were asked to
evaluate the programs* performance in the past, the present
and the future. Therefore, program satisfaction will be
reported as three separate categories in Table 5»1» These
additional categories will be elaborated on below.
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Communication Flow "+ . 356 4.310 4.294 4.302
Decision Making M. . 3S7 4.274 4.063 4.062
Motivation Index 4.1+26 4.254 4.397 4.233
Human Resource
Emphasis 4.191 4.054 4.136 4.191
Supervisory Leadership 4.354 4.223 4.249 4.221
Support Index 4.244 4.134 3.952 3.913
Team Coordination 4.314 4.286 4.262 4.081
Team Emphasis 4.453 4.411 4.488 4.535
Goal Emphasis 4.605 4.375 4.512 4.512
Work Facilitation 4.155 3.911 4.032 4.062
Peer Leadership 4.184 4.020 4.067 3.895
Support Index 4.000 3.786 3.881 3.505
Team Emphasis 4.174 4.027 4.131 4.035
Goal Emphasis 4.395 4.179 4.155 4.209
Work Group Processes 4.186 3.886 4.015 3.794
Discipline Index 4.279 4.045 4 .274 4.305
End Result Measures tf .063 3.934 4.018 4.013
Goal Integration 4.151 4.089 4.405 4.280
Satisfaction Index 4.287 4.232 4.222 4.098
Lower Level
Influence 3.105 3.375 3.095 3.488
Training 4.171 4.157 4.190 4.230
Personnel
Considerations 3.578 3.670 3.401 3.463
Structure
Orientation 3.227 3.201 3.425 3.402
Prgm. Sat. Past 3.634 3.593 2.357 3.095
Prgm. Sat. Present 4.619 4.426 2.929 3.333




The majority of the twenty-two categories and sub-
categories that were developed from the first sixty
questions of the survey reveal means of around k.O. The
lower level influence sub-category was consistently reported
in the 3.1 to 3.5 range. This is not too surprising as
these questions asked officers to indicate the degree to
which non-supervisory personnel affect what takes place in
an effective organization. All officers appeared to believe
that participation at the lowest levels is not necessarily
very important to an "effective organization."
Although the differences are not much greater than tenths
in most categories and sub-categories, it is interesting to
note several comparisons. For instance, the OEMC means are
all lower than the HRMS means with the exception of only one
sub-category, that of lower level influence. At first
glance, this would seem to indicate that the 0E officers are
generally less inclined to espouse participative management,
ala Likert than are the HRMS officers. This may be a reflec-
tion of the type of training that these two groups of officers
receive from their respective service schools.
The surface warfare officers reported means that were
lower than their HRMS practitioners in nineteen of twenty-two
cases. The surface warfare officers only had higher means in
the sub-categories of team emphasis, goal integration, and
training. This would seem to indicate, on the average, that
surface warfare officers are less System k oriented than the
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Navy's HRM consultants. This would appear to be reasonable
since the HRMSs attend school for twelve weeks and specifi-
cally learn about the value of different management styles
and situational leadership practices.
As opposed to the Navy operational officers, the Army's
combat arms officers reported lower means than their OEMC
practitioners in half of the twenty-two possible cases.
This would seem to indicate that there might not be a
significant difference between the philosophies espoused by
the OEMCs and the combat arms officers. This might also
indicate a closer fit of "effectiveness philosophies" between
the Army's operational officers and OEMCs than that between
the Navy's operational officers and the HRMSs.
There do not appear to be any obvious trends nor dif-
ferences between the means reported by the surface warfare
officers and the combat arms officers. At first glance,
this may prove to show that there may be consistent and
congruent philosophies of organizational effectiveness between
the Army's operational officers and the Navy's operational
officers
.
Five additional categories were included in this study.
The two categories of personnel considerations and structure
orientation are descriptive categories of Fleishman's Leader-
ship Questionnaire. This questionnaire was also modified to
include the statement "In an effective organization ..."
before each question. These two categories were included in
7^

an attempt to identify what the officer leadership of today
felt was the most effective leadership style. The original
Fleishman survey was scaled from to 4. This scale was
changed to read from 1 to 5 for "the purpose of this study
to correlate with the sixty Likert scaled questions at
the beginning of the modified survey.
The personnel considerations category reflects the degree
to which the respondent believes that the human resource
element of an organization is important. The structure
orientation category reflects the degree to which the res-
pondent believes that the leader should be task- or mission-
oriented as opposed to people-oriented. It is interesting
to note that in these categories the only group which reported
a higher mean for structure than for personnel was the sur-
face warfare group. This would appear to indicate that
accomplishing the job or mission may be more important to
the surface warfare officers than attending to the needs of
their people.
The program satisfaction categories reflect how the
various groups of officers view the success and future
potential of the OE/HRM programs. In reporting the data
the questions were not combined in any manner in order to
provide the reader an opportunity to view the perceptions of
the respondents concerning the past, present and future of
the established programs. One can readily see from the mean
scores that there is a general level of dissatisfaction among
75

operational officers with the past performance of the programs
Surprisingly the practitionaires of the OD program share this
opinion of the past performance.
The opinions of the various groups change when the time
frame of the questions shift to the present and the future.
The combat/surface-line officers maintain their rather bleak
view of the overall worth of the HRM/OE programs, with mean
responses of between 2.4 and 3»3- On the others hand the
specialist see themselves as a current success and with
potential for the future. Their mean scores ranged from
4.1 to 4.6.
In comparing the results presented and the philosophy of
Likert it appears that all of the officers tend toward a
System 4 management style. However, there are occasions
when the responses definitely indicate a more authoritative
style of leadership. Possibly the most descriptive word for
the responses would be consultative, or Likert 's System 3«
In any case, these respondents seem to be departing from the
traditional military role of "damn the people and just get
the job done," to a more open form of management.
C. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF GROUP MEAN DATA
Having discussed apparent trends, differences, and com-
monalities of the group mean data, it is appropriate to sub-
ject the data to statistical analysis. The t-test with an
alpha level of .05 was utilized to determine if there were
significant differences between means. The pooled variance
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estimate was used instead of the separate variance estimate
because it is the more critical test by virtue of its use
of greater degrees of freedom. The four comparisons that
were made include HRJVIS versus OEMC, HRMS versus surface-
line, OEIVIC versus combat arms, and combat arms versus sur-
face-line. Each comparison (Table 5-2) warrants a separate
discussion.
1. HRMS Versus OEMC
The t-test analysis that compared the HRMS officer
results to those of the OEMC officer shows significant findings
in two sub-categories (supervisory leadership-goal emphasis
and work facilitation) and one category (Work Group Processes).
In all three cases the HRMS officers reported higher means
than the OEMC officers. This would appear to indicate that
the HRMS officers are more inclined to support the participa-
tive style of management in these areas of supervisory leader-
ship and work group processes than are the OEMC officers.
This significance may be attributed to a difference in train-
ing that these two groups of officers receive, but the
authors have no explicit explanation for these differences.
In fact, we did not expect any significant differences from
this comparison group.
2. HRMS Versus Surface Line
The comparison of the HRMS officers with the Navy's
surface-line officers resulted in five significant differ-
ences between the means. In the decision making sub-category
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Communication Flow 4 .356
Decision Making 4 .357
Motivation Index it .426
Human Resource
Emphasis 1+ .191
Supervisory Leadership 4 .354
Support Index 4 .244
Team Coordination 4 .311+







Work Group Processes 4. 186
Discipline Index 4. 279
End Result Measures 4. 063
Goal Integration 4. 151





















































































3.227 3.201 3.425 3.402 .2
1.634 3.5.9? 2.357 3.095 2
4.519 4.426 2.929 3.333 2,3
4.408 H .148 2.405 3.000 2,3,4
1=HRM vs. OEMC
2=HRM vs. Surface-Line
3=0EMC vs. Combat Arms
4=Combat Arms vs. Surface-Line
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and the supervisory leadership-support index the HRMS
officers reported higher means than the Navy's operational
leaders. These higher means appear to show that the Navy
trained HRM specialists are more System 4 oriented than the
operational leaders in the fleet. One explanation for this
difference is that the operational officers may feel that
those people affected by decisions should not necessarily
have a say about those decisions. When decisions are made,
they are to be followed and not questioned.
The supervisory leadership-support index is interes-
ting for it is here that the survey asks how important it is
for the supervisor to be friendly and easy to approach as well
as understanding when it comes to the problems of subordinates.
The surface-line officers reported significantly lower means
than the HRMSs (3-952 versus k.Zkk) indicating a more
authoritative style. The authors believe this difference
can be attributed in large part to the tradition and image
of the military. The typical noncommissioned officer is
expected to be professionally tough and demanding, a
Sergeant Rock as opposed to a sympatico. The surface-line
officers appear to continue to support this unwritten, but
commonly accepted image and tradition.
Within the leadership indices of Fleishman's modi-
fied questionnaire, this comparison group displayed signi-
ficantly different means for both categories, personnel
considerations and structure orientation. As expected, the
HRMSs reported a higher mean for personnel considerations
and the surface-line officers reported a higher mean in
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structure orientation. The HRMSs are predictably more
people oriented because of the specialized training they
receive in organizational development and human relations.
Likewise, the higher structure mean for the surface-line
officers is indicative of their concern with accomplishing
the task and mission as directed from within the hierarchy*
Mission first, people second. Tradition and competition
within the officer crops probably drive the surface-line
officers to concentrate on accomplishing the mission despite
any obstacles and handicaps that may exist.
This comparison group had one more interesting
difference, that of program satisfaction. The HRMS officers
felt that they were doing a good job providing services and
were equally optimistic of providing continued good service
in the future as indicated by their scores of ^.6 and b.Q.
The surface-line officers, however, have a different opinion
about the HRM past successes and future potential as they
reported means of 2.9/2.^. This appears to indicate that
there are some contradictory opinions regarding the acceptance
of this "people-oriented" program within the Navy. This
significant difference would appear to be disheartening for
the Navy leadership of today as well as for the future HRJVlSs
of the Navy.
3- OEMC Versus Combat Arms
The comparison between the 0E officers and the combat
arms officers is very similar to the HRM and surface-line
comparison. Four of the five areas that this comparison group
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reported as being significantly different were the same as
those of the HRM and surface-line comparison. Those four
include decision making, supervisory leadership-support
index, personnel considerations, and program satisfaction.
Using the same rationale for this group as the previous
group, the authors believe that tradition, custom, and image
dictate obedience, discipline, and mission accomplishment.
Hence, the differences in the decision making and super-
visory leadership-support sub-categories.
This comparison group also showed a difference in the
sub-category of satisfaction. The OE officers reported a
mean of ^.232 and the combat arms officers reported a mean
of ^.098. This sub-category asked the respondents to
imagine an "effective organization" and to indicate how
satisfied they were with their work group, supervisor, duties,
and past and future progress in the military. The school
trained theorists apparently believe that there should be
a higher degree of individual satisfaction in an effective
organization than the combat arms officers. The combat arms
officer may believe that it is not necessary that an indi-
vidual like his job and supervisor, only that he perform
his job and perform it correctly.
This comparison group also showed significant dif-
ferences between means in the personnel considerations and
program satisfaction categories. The OE officers reported
higher means in both categories than the combat arms officers.
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In the personnel considerations category the combat arms
officer is much like the Navy surface -line officer in that
both operational officer groups are less "people-oriented"
than their school trained practitioners who provide the
HRM/OE services. This was to be expected in the study as the
authors contend that the socialization of the HRM and OE
officers result in these officers being more people conscious
than the operational officers to whom they provide service.
The program satisfaction categories are very signifi-
cant. The OE officers consistently report a higher mean than
their operational counterparts. This would seem to indicate,
much as in the HRM/surface-line comparison group, that there
is not total agreement and acceptance between the practi-
tioners and recipients of the value and worth of these
organizational development programs. The operational leaders
appear to be less confident of the program's past successes
as well as the prospects for the future. The practitioners,
however, appear to be content with their services to date
and apparently have high hopes for this continued success
in the future. This blatant dichotomy of opinions would
appear to be a challenging obstacle for current and future
practitioners to overcome.
k. Combat Arms Versus Surface -Line
This comparison group was studied to see if the
operational leaders of the Army and Navy had similar views
regarding organizational effectiveness, leadership styles,
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and the acceptance of the OE and HKM programs, respectively.
There were only two cases in which this comparison showed
significant differences, in lower level influence and pro-
gram satisfaction. It is interesting to note that in these
two cases none of the reported means even approaches ^.0.
The lower level influence questions asked the respondents
the degree to which lower level supervisors and nonsuper-
visory personnel influence what goes on in the command.
Although there was a significant difference between the means
on this comparison, it should also be noted that all means
were low in this sub-category. Accordingly, all officers
in this study apparently believe that it is not very impor-
tant that lower level supervisors and nonsupervisory per-
sonnel should influence the activities of the command.
There also was a significant difference between the
means regarding how these officers viewed the HRM/OE programs.
Although both reported relatively low means, the surface-line
mean was significantly lower than the combat arms means. This
apparently shows that both operational groups have not totally
accepted the worth of the HRM and OE programs and perhaps
the Navy less so than the Army. This presents a real chal-
lenge to the practitioners in the field, for they are the
ones who must attempt to change these negative attitudes if





In summary, when significant differences did exist
between operational officer and practitioner in people
oriented categories, it was the practitioner who generally
reported the higher means. The authors believe this is
attributed to the socialization process that takes place
as a result of attendance at the specialized schools for
the practitioners. Additionally, it appears that the
attitudes of the operational officers regarding the worth
of the HRM and OE programs are very negative. If the
acceptance of these programs by the operational leaders is
indeed that negative, then the senior leadership and prac-
titioners of the programs must do something to change these
perceptions .
The summary and conclusions of the study will be
presented in the next chapter. Additionally, recommendations





Figure 6.1 provides the reader with a pictorial display
of the statistical analysis of the major categories of
Likert's survey discussed in Chapter V. While it does not
provide exact mean response scores, it does indicate the
relative position of each group to the other as well as
relative to Likert's System + management style.
The overall scores are lower than originally expected
especially for the HRMSs and the OEMCs. The authors'
hypothesis was that these scores would reflect a closer
acceptance of Likert's System 4- style. While the responses
indicate a move toward the ideal of System •+, it does not
appear that the emphasis to measure "5" in every category is
as paramount to the practitioners as one would expect by
their very use of the survey. The responses of all four
groups were similar with everyone agreeing that lower level
influence tends toward System 2 (3*265) while the sub-cate-
gory of goal emphasis under supervisory leadership had the
highest degree of System h- [k-.^Ol).
The rank order of the groups is the same in the first
four categories. The Army combat officer is least inclined
to adopt the concept of total participative management.























Figure 5.1 Group Means Peported by Likert's Dimension.
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officer and finally the HRMS . The original hypothesis pro-
posed "by this study reflected the authors "belief that the
specialist in the OD field would score higher than their
operational counterparts. It is logical to assume that the
practitioners of the HRM/OE programs would lean more toward
a participative style of management in comparison to their
operational counterparts, since these personnel have received
formalized training in the field.
In the fifth category, End Result Measures, the only
change in the relative order of the groups is an exchange of
positions between the OEMCs and the Army combat officer.
This appears to be a direct result of the belief of some
OEMCs that a participative style of management is not
required for goal integration and lower level influence,
both sub-categories of End Result Measures. The only con-
clusion that can be ascertained from this data is that when
it comes to finalizing and implementing the goals of an
organization, the responsibility for these actions rests
solely with the leader. According to the OEMCs, the leader
should make the final decision.
It is interesting to note that the Army OEMCs report
consistently lower scores than the Navy surface-line
officers. While a direct comparison (t-test) was not con-
ducted, one would intuitively feel that the exact opposite
would oe true, i.e., the OEMC would more likely be System k>
oriented. One can conclude that the surface-line officer
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has been socialized by the Navy's HRM program, a program that
is heavily based on the Likert model. On the other hand,
the OEMC, while a firm believer in participative management,
is still closely associated with his operational counterparts.
In each of these five categories, the mean response is in
the iJ-.O range with the low being 3-79^ and the high ^.35^-
The responses differ significantly in the following five
categories of personnel considerations, structure orienta-
tion, and program satisfaction. The first two categories
provide the responses to Fleishman's Leadership Opinion
Survey and the last three are the respondents' perceptions of
the success of the OD program within their respective ser-
vice. It must again be noted that these categories were
modified to be placed on the Likert scale to provide a point
of comparison with the other categories. This scale was not
utilized by Fleishman in his original survey, but the
authors believe that similar scaling facilitates data com-
parisons for the reader.
Despite the differences noted within Fleishman's cate-
gories of personnel considerations and structure orientation,
there are little differences when one combines these res-
pective scores. The results of adding the two categories
to form a new score reflect the following totals-. HRMS
6.80; OEIVIC 6.87; Surface-Line 6.82; and Combat Arms 6.86.
Although this is a nonrigorous test, it does highlight an
interesting proposition. Should the emphasis of leadership
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style "be placed upon process (personnel considerations) or
upon objectives (structure orientation)? The authors have
no clear-cut answer for this question, "but rather surface it
as an issue to be considered when considering the important
elements of "effective leadership."
It is immediately evident that the perceptions of the
four groups significantly differ from the previous cate-
gories analyzed. There is a difference in relationship
between each group and a difference in the range of the mean
scores. The drop in the mean score response range, J.8-k.6
to 3.2-3.6, can be attributed to two factors. First, the
answer categories changed. In the first section of the
survey (sixty questions), the best answer was "to a very
great extent." However, in the second section of the survey
(forty questions), the best answer was "always" in over half
of the questions. The authors believe that the respondents
were less inclined to select "always" because it is such an
absolute response. Accordingly, we believe that the officers
hedged their answers which in turn lowered the mean responses.
Second, the survey really addresses two different targets.
The first section of the survey emphasizes the organization
as a whole and asks the respondents about various aspects
of the unit. The second section concentrates on an indi-
vidual, "the leader" within an organization. Noting this
difference, the authors believe that the data support a





The rank order of the four groups is interesting for
these categories when compared to the previous five cate-
gories. The relative positioning of the groups changes
noticeably. The operational officers score lower than the
practitioners when it comes to the people of the organization.
The direct opposite occurs when the actual mission of the
organization is taken into account. This appears to show
that the operational officer is more concerned with the
overall accomplishment of the mission while the HRM and OE
practitioner is more concerned with the people of the organi-
zation. This would seem to imply that the training received
by the practitioner is a major factor in the higher mean
being reported by the OE and HRM officers. Likewise, the
emphasis placed on accomplishing the mission for the opera-
tional officer forces him to place more emphasis on the
structure or task element of his job.
The final category examined was the satisfaction of each
group with the OE and HRM programs. The ranking of the
groups regarding this category was also placed on the one to
five scale in order to provide easy and quick reference for
the reader. The measurement of this category is not identi-
fying the style of management, but rather the success of
the HRM and OE programs in the past, the present, and the
future. This section had the most divergent views of all
the categories. The Navy surface-line officers responded
with the lowest mean responses in all the categories in this
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section with the Array combat officers next. Finally, the
practitioners of the OE/HRM programs responded typically for
personnel who are both proud and confident of their respec-
tive programs. The obvious conclusion is that the opera-
tional personnel do not "believe that the program is working
at all. They view this as a nice to have people program that
may deserve attention after the rest of their required work
is completed. On the other hand, the practitioners see it
as a very positive program that has potential to be of
assistance to the leaders and the organizations.
B. CONCLUSIONS
Based on the data gathered from the one hundred and
eight-four respondents, the following conclusions are made
in regard to the four original hypothesis.
l) The OEMCs did in fact report a higher mean than their
operational counterparts in over half of the categories/sub-
categories; the number was expected to be higher. This
indicates that there might be a basic agreement between
the two groups in regard the most effective style of manage-
ment, i.e., a consultative style of management.
Z) The HRMSs also scored higher than their operational
counterparts on the survey. The difference in the results
of this comparison is the gap between the two groups. Unlike
the Army, the Navy HRIVISs reported higher means in twenty-three
of the twenty-seven categories/sub-categories. This definitly
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indicates a broader divergencie of perceptions among the
specialist and the operational prersonnel.
3) The next hypothesis tested was that the OEMCs and
the HRMSs would score similar means. While the trends were
similar, the actual scores were not as close as we had
originally hypothesied. It should he noted that the dif-
ferences were rarely significant and in fact were numerically
close; however, the HRMSs reported higher scores in every
area with the exception of 'Lower-level Influence' and
'Personnel Considerations.' Since these scores were so
close very little can be concluded from the data. It does
appear that the HRMSs are more closely aligned to Likert's
model than the OEMCs.
b) The final hypothesis was that the operational officers
of "both services would report similar means. As with the
specialist of the field these two groups reported virtually
the same means for every category/sub-category . Unlike the
HRMSs/OEMCs, no conclusions can be made about the data since
each group scored higher in one-half of the answers.
In summarising the conclusions, we believe that the data
reflect an optimal response other than Likert's optimum of
'5'« Though the mean scores are close to 5 in most cases,
it does not appear that these officer groups who were surveyed
believe that effectiveness is dependent upon attaining this
optimum in all sub-categories; therefore, reconsideration
of how the survey data are used and interpreted may indeed
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be appropriate for the services to consider. In fact, these
data appear to show that the practitioners and operational
officers are currently inclined to reflect a more consultative
style of management (System 3) rather than participative
(System k) ; although, as previously stated, there appears
to be a movement on each groups part toward System k.
Weighing this fact against the values and ethics of the
military, the appropriate management style for today's officer
might be consultative rather than participative. In any
case, the survey reflects the degrees of either style.
Overall, there were few categories which reported signi-
ficant differences; however, some patterns were evident.
The practitioners generally reported higher means than the
operational officers. They were more personnel oriented and
felt that decisions should be made using the participative
approach. Additionally, all groups generally felt that
effective organizations do not require influence and parti-
cipation from lower level and non- supervisory personnel.
These patterns and trends appear to indicate that partici-
pation may not be the ideal state for the military organiza-
tion of today.
The program satisfaction results appear to show cause for
some concern. There are drastic differences between the
perceptions of the practitioners and the operational officers
regarding the value of the organizational management programs
in the Army and Navy. These contradictory views pose a serious
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challenge to the top leadership of the services as well as
to the current and future practitioners in the field.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following are recommendations cased on the data
collected and the conclusions drawn while conducting this
study
.
1) Expand the study. While the data collected are
valuable in evaluating the perceptions of the military
leadership regarding organizational effectiveness, the
relative size of the sample is not adequate. To accumulate
more meaningful data, a larger sample size should "be sought
to incorporate a wider cross section of the military popula-
tion. There are other groups of personnel that have a
meaningful impact on the policies and directions of the
armed services. We specifically feel that the senior non-
commissioned officers and more senior officers should be
surveyed to ascertain their perceptions and philosophies
regarding organizational effectiveness and leadership.
2) Reassess the Use of the Survey. The responses gen-
erated for the purpose of this study include one hundred and
eight-four officers in the Army and Navy. A little over one
half of the responses come from the actual trained specialist
in the field of organizational development. Consequently,
the results cannot be easily ignored. The tendency for
the four groups to answer the various categories and sub-
categories in the ^ . range should be an indication that
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"5" might not be the ideal for the military environment. The
results appear to indicate that a different norm may be
appropriate. Perhaps this study is an indication that the
participative style of management is not truly the ideal
style for the military.
3) Program Satisfaction. There is a significant differ-
ence between what the operational officers believe and what
the practitioners believe regarding the acceptance and
the worth of the organizational development programs. To
remedy this situation, the OE/HRM personnel must do a
better job of selling their respective programs to the opera-
tional units. The key appears to be not in pursuing the
people aspect of the program but in concentrating the OD
efforts in the structural aspect and mission accomplishment





Note: Read these answer choices over carefully.
Then answer each of the following questions
by placing an X in the numbered box under
the answer you want to give.
1. In an effective organization, to what extent is
the amount of information shared among work groups
adequate to meet job requirements?
2. In an effective organization, to what extent does
the command do a good job in "putting out the word"
to all hands?
3. In an effective organization, to what extent is the
chain of command receptive to ideas and suggestions
from members of the command?
4. In an effective organization, decisions are made at
the level of command where the most adequate inform-
ation is available.
5. In an effective organization, information is widely
shared so that those who make decisions have access
to available know-how.
6. In an effective organization, when decisions are
made, to what extent are the people affected asked
for their ideas?
7. In an effective organization, to what extent do
people in the command feel motivated to contribute
their best efforts to the command's mission and tasks?
8. In an effective organization, to what extent are
there things about this command (people, policies or
conditions) that encourage you to work hard?
9. In an effective organization, to what extent do people
who work hard receive recognition from the command?
10. In an effective organization, to what extent does the
command have a real interest in the welfare and morale
of assigned personnel?
11. In an effective organization, to what extent are work
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Note: Read these answer choices over carefully.
Then answer each of the following questions
by placing an X in the numbered box under
the answer you want to give.
12. In an effective organization, to what extent does the
command have clear-cut, reasonable goals and objectives
that contribute to its mission accomplishment?
13. In an effective organization, workload and time factors
are seriously considered in planning work group assign-
ments.
14. In an effective organization, people at higher levels of
that command are aware of problems at all levels of the 1 3 4 5
chain. Q
15. In an effective organization, to what extent are super- 12 3 4 5
visors friendly and easy to approach? • Zl C
16. In an effective organization, to what extent do super- 12 3 4 5
visors pay attention to what subordinates say?
17. In an effective organization, to what extent are super- 12 3 4 5
visors willing to listen to subordinates' problems? [~
18. In an effective organization when things are not going
as well as supervisor expects, to what extent is it 12 3 4 5
easier for subordinates to tell him/her?
19. In an effective organization, to what extent do super-
visors attempt to work out conflicts within their work
group?
20. In an effective organization, tjo what extent do super-
visors encourage the people in their work group to ex-
change opinions and ideas?
21. In an effective organization, to what extent do super-
visors encourage the people in their work group to work
as a team?
22. In an effective organization, to what extent do super- .
visors stress a team goal?
23: In an effective organization, to what extent do super-
visors encourage the members of their work group to give 12 3 4 5
their best efforts? D D D D D
24. In an effective organization, to what extent do super-
visors expect high standards of performance from the 12 3 4 5
members of their work group? ~| | | | [
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Note: Read these answer choices over carefully.
Then answer each of the following questions
by placing an X in the number box under the
answer you want to give.
25. In an effective organization, to what extent do super-
visors help subordinates to improve their performance?
26. In an effective organization, to what extent do super-
visors provide the assistance their subordinates need
to plan, organize and schedule their work ahead of time?
27. In an effective organization, to what extent do super-
visors offer subordinates ideas to help solve job- 12 3 4 5
related problems? D D D D D
28. In an effective organization, how friendly and comfort- 1 2 3 4 5.
able are work group members with each other?
29. In an effective organization, to what extent do work 12 3 4 5
group members listen to each others' problems?
30. In an effective organization, to what extent do work
group members take responsibility for resolving dis-
agreements among themselves working out acceptable 12 3 4 5
solutions?
31. In an effective organization, how much do work group 12 3 4 5
members encourage each other to work as a team?
_j J _ Q
32. In an effective organization, how much do work group 12 3 4 5
members stress a team goal?
_
__. Q Q
33. In an effective organization, how much do work group 12 3 4 5
members encourage each other to give their best effort? M * Q 33
34. In an effective organization, to what extent do work 12 3 4 5
members maintain high standards of performance?
^J ;
35. In an effective organization, to what extent do work
group members offer each other ideas for solving job- 12 3 4 5
related problems? D D D D
36. In an effective organization, to what extent do work
group members plan together and coordinate their in- 12 3 4 5
dividual efforts? D D D D D
37. In an .effective organization, to what extent are work
group members expected to make decisions and solve 12 3 4 5
problems? D D D D D
38. In an effective organization, to what extent are work




Note: Read these answer choices over carefully.
Then answer each of the following questions
by placing an X in the number box under the
answer you want to give.
39. In an effective organization, to what extent do
members of the command maintain high standards of
courtesy, appearance and grooming?
40. In an effective organization, to what extent are high
standards of order and discipline maintained within
the command?
41. In an effective organization, to what extent is the
command effective in getting you to meet its needs
and contribute to its effectiveness?
42. In an effective organization, to what extent does the
command do a good job of meeting the needs of its
members?
Note: Read these answer choices over carefully.
There are different answers from the previous
choices. Then answer each of the following
questions by placing and X in the numbered box
under the answer you want to give.
43. In an effective organization, how satisfied are
members with the people in their work group?
44. In an effective organization, how satisfied are
members with their supervisor?
45. In an effective organization, how satisfied are
members with the command?
46. In an effective organization, how satisfied are
members with their individual job assignments?
47. In an effective organization, how satisfied are
individuals with the progress that they have made
in the military up to now?
48. In an effective organization, how satisfied are
members with their perceived chances of getting
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Note: -Read the answer choices carefully. They ire
different from the previous choices. Then answer
each of the following questions by placing an X
in the numbered box under the answer you want to
give.
49. In an effective organization, to what extent do
lower level supervisors influence what goes on in
command?
50. In an effective organization, to what extent do
non-supervisory personnel influence what goes on
on in command?
51. In an effective organization, to what extent does
the command emphasize training which helps personnel
performing their assigned tasks?
52. In an effective organization, to what extent does
the command emphasize training which helps personnel
leadership responsibility?
53. In an effective organization, to what extent does the
command emphasize training which helps personnel to
accept increased technical responsibility?
54. In an effective organization, to what extent does
the command ensure that all personnel have equal
opportunity for advancement in rate, rank, or grade?
55. In an effective organization, to what extent is the
chain of command willing to take action on known or
alleged racial/ethnic issues?
56. In an effective organization, to what extent is the
chain of command willing to take action on known or
alleged sex discrimination issues?
57. In an effective organization, to what extent do work
group members discourage drug abuse?
58. In an effective organization, to what extent do
personnel feel free to talk to their supervisor
about a drug problem in their work group?
59. In an effective organization, to what extent do
personnel feel free to talk to their supervisor
about an alcohol problem in their work group?
60. In an effective organization, to what extent do
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Notei Read the following choices carefully. Por each item choose the alternative which
oat nearly expresses your opinion of an "effective leader". Always indicate what
you, as a manager in an "effective organization", sincerely believe to be the de-
sirable way to act. Please rememccr— there are no right or wrong answers to these
questions. We are interested only in your opinions.
Hark an "X" in the box that best expresses your opinion.
61. In an effective organization, the leader places the welfare of his unit above the











Once in a while
Very seldom





Once in a while
Very seldom




Once in a while
Very seldom

















Once in a while
Very seldom






69. In an effective organization, the leader insists that persons under him follow















Note: Read the following choices carefully. Tor each item choose the alternative which
most nearly expresses your opinion of an "effective leader". Always indicate what
you, as a manager in an "effective organization", sincerely believe to be the de-
sirable way to act. Please remember— that there are no right or wrong answers to
these questions. Me are interested only in your opinions.
Mark an "X" in the box that best expresses your opinion.






72. In an effective organization, the leader gets the approval of his subordinates on














74. In an effective organization, the leader personally assigns tasks to be done






75. In an effective organization, the leader speaks in a manner which implies he






76. In an effective organization, the leader stresses the importance of being






77. In an effective organization, the leader criticizes a specific act rather than






78. In an effective organization, the leader lets subordinates do. their work the way










Once in a while
Very seldom








Motai Read the following choices carefully. For each Item choose the alternative which
most nearly expresses /our opinion of an "effective leader". Always indicate what
you, as a manager in an "effective organization", sincerely believe to be the de-
• irable way to act. Plea3e remember— there are no right or wrong answers to these
questions. We are interested only in your opinions.
Hark an "X" in the box that bast expresses your opinion.
81. In an effective organization, the leader demands that he be informed of decisions












Once in a while
Very seldom













85. In an effective organization, the leader talks about the amount of work that he

























89. In an effective organization, the leader changes the duties of his subordinates




Once in a while
Very seldom
90. In an effective organization, the leader decides "in detail" what shall be done








Notes Read the following choices carefully. For each item choose the alternative which
most nearly expresses your opinion of an "effective leader". Always indicate what
you, as a aanager in an "effective organization", sincerely believe to bo the de-
sirable way to act. Please remember— there are no right or wrong answers to these
questions. We are interested only in your opinion.
Mark ait "X" in the box that best expresses your opinion.
91. In an effective organization,
up to their capacity.






92. In an effective organization, the leader stands up for his subordinates even though











Once in a while
Very seldom




Once in a while
Very seldom
95. In an effective organization, the leader asks for sacrifices from subordinates for




Once in a while
Very seldom
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Once in a while
Very seldom









Note: Read the answer choices carefully. Then answer
the questions by placing an X in the numbered
box under the answer you wish to give.
SUCCESS OF OE IN THE ARMY
101. Over the past three years , to what extent,
in your opinion, has OE been successful in
assisting this command to become an effec-
tive organization?
102. In your opinion, to what extent does OE
currently have the potential to be success^
ful in assisting this command to become an
effective organization?
103. Over the next three years , to what extent,
do you expect OE to be successful in
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DEMOGRAPHICS
















3. How many years of active duty
have you served?
years
4. Have you held command?
Yes
1




If so, at what level? (Indicate









5. When did you complete the OE school?
month/year
6. What is your current duty
assignment? (e.g., OESO, FORSCOM HQ,
OE Instructor, OECS, Ft. Ord)
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Note: Read the answer choices carefully. Then answer
the questions by placing an X in the numbered
box under the answer you wish to give.
SUCCESS OF HRM IN THE NAVY
101. Over the past three years
,
to what extent, in your
opinion, have HRMC/D's been successful in assisting
commands you've served in to become effective or-
ganizations?
102. In your opinion, to what extent do HRMC/D's
currently have the potential to be successful in
assisting Navy commands in becoming effective
organizations?
103. Over the next three years
,
to what extent do you
expect HRMC/D's to be successful in assisting
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3. How many years of active duty
have you served?



















Note: Read the answer choices carefully. Then answer
the questions by placing an X in the numbered
box under the answer you wish to give.
SUCCESS OF HRM IN THE NAVY
101. Over the past three years , to what extent, in your
opinion, has your HRMC/TJ~been successful in
assisting its client commands in becoming effec-
tive organizations?
102. In your opinion, to what extent does your HRMC/0
currently have the potential to be successful in
assisting its client commands in becoming effec-
tive organizations?
103. Over the next three years
,
to what extent, do you
expect your HRMC/D to be successful in assisting
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2. What is your sex?
1
Male
Q] Fema 1 e
2
3. How many years of active duty
have you served?
years
4. Have you held command at sea?
1












6. When did you complete the HRM
school?
month/year
7. What activity (e.g., HRMO Mayport,




Note: Read the answer choices carefully. Then answer
the questions by placing an X in the numbered
box under the answer you wish to give.
SUCCESS OF OE IN THE ARMY
101. Over the past three years , to what extent,
in your opinion, has OE been successful in
assisting this command to become an effec-
tive organization?
102. In your opinion, to what extent does OE
currently have the potential to be success-
ful in assisting this command to become an
effective organization?
103. Over the next three years , to what extent, do you
expect OE to be successful in assisting this
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3. How many years of active duty
have you served?
years
4. Have you held command?
a y«
i




5. If so, at what level? (Indicate












1. The following gives a description of how the question-
naire was coded for use in the SPSS systems packet.
2. One thru five were the numerical values given to the
responses on questions 1-100. On questions 101-103
these responses were also provided with the addition
of number six. The descriptive value for each ques-
tion is provided in the survey itself. Any answer
that wan not marked was coded zero and treated as a
missing value in the analysis.
3. With the addition of the demographic data, two com-
puter cards were utilized for entry into the system.
Each set of cards was given a 4 digit code at the
beginning of each case to identify which category
(HRMS, OEMC, etc.) and survey were being analyzed.
3. The section below provides a breakdown of the coding
of the survey. This procedure will permit easy coding
for any additional information in the future.
CARD COL QUESTION ITEM/CODE VARIABLE NAME
Respondent No. Person
#1 (First card of each Person
case) *
Category CATEG
Command Climate Com- COMCLCF 1-3
munications Flow
Command Climate COMCLDM 1-3
Decision Making
Command Climate COMCLMI 1-3
Motivation Index
Command Climate Human COMCLHR 1-5
Resource
Supervisory Leadership SUPLDSI 1-4
Support Index
Supervisory Leadership SUPLDTC 1-2
Team Coordination


















































































END OF FIRST CARD
CARD COL QUESTION ITEM/CODE VARIABLE NAME
1-2 _ Same as first card «.
3 - #2 (second Card) -
4 - Same as first card -
5-44 61-100 Leadership Opinion In-
dex
LI 1-40




48 - Rank of Respondent Rank











CARD COL QUESTION ITEM/CODE VARIABLE NAME










5^-57 - Completion date of for- SCHDATE
mal education at HRM/
OE school
58 - Major Silitary Com- MA COM
mand




£=Army Combat Arms Officer
** On the questionnaires sent to the Naval Officers, this
question refers to command at sea.
*** On the questionnaire sent to the Naval Officers, this
question asks the officer if he/she has held command
at a shore billet.
l=Yes
2=Selected but have not assumed
3=No
Armv Naw
1= FORSCOM San Diego
2= TRADOC Washington
3= USAREUR Mayport
km MED COM Charleston
5= - Pearl Harbor
6= - Norfolk
7= - Surface Warfare
8= Ft. Ord —
k. The following section provides the coding and method of
computation for the categories and subcategories utilized
for comparison in the study. This information does not
represent data placed on cards but rather a manipulation
of the section above.
Ill

VAR NAME VAR LABEL




















+ C19 Supervisory Leadership
CIO Peer Leadership Support
Index
Cll Peer Leadership Team
Emphasis
C12 Peer Leadership Goal
Emphasis
+ C20 Peer Leadership
C13 Work Group Processes
Discipline Index
+ C21 Work Group Process
COMPUTATION
COMCLCF 1+COMCLCF 2+
COMCLCF 3 7 3
COMCLDM 1+COMCLDM 2 +
COMCLDM 3 7 3
COMCLMI 1+COMCLMI 2+











SUPLDWF 3 f 3










WRKPRRI 1 + C13 t ^
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3+ERMDA 1+ERMDA 2 +
ERMDA 3+ERMDA 4+
C14 + 015 + C16 +
C17 7 11
Personnel Considerations LI 2+ LI 5+(LI 7)+(LI8)+
LI 10+(LI11)+ LI 12+
(LI13) + (LU5)+LI 17+




Structure Oriented LI 1+LI 3+LI 4+LI 6+
LI9+LI 14+LI 16 + (LI 18) +
LI 20 + LI 21+LI 22+LL
25+(LI26)+ LI 27+LI 30+
LI 31+LI 35+(LI36)+LI 39
+LI 40 - 20
+ = Major Categories
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